IAEA Access After Strikes: What Inspectors Can Prove, and What They Cannot

Overview

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the only international body with the technical mandate and on-the-ground presence to verify the status of Iran's nuclear program. Its inspectors conduct routine and short-notice visits to declared nuclear facilities, collect environmental samples to detect undeclared nuclear material, and maintain surveillance equipment designed to ensure "continuity of knowledge" -- an unbroken chain of monitoring that allows the Agency to account for all nuclear material at a site.

The February 2026 military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities have created an unprecedented challenge for IAEA verification. Strikes damaged infrastructure at declared sites, Iran has restricted inspector access citing safety and sovereignty, and surveillance equipment at multiple facilities has gone offline. The result is a growing verification gap: a period during which the IAEA cannot confirm what is happening at Iran's nuclear sites with the confidence required by its safeguards mandate.

This article explains what IAEA inspectors can actually verify when they have access, what they cannot verify even under ideal conditions, and how the current access restrictions affect international confidence in assessments of Iran's nuclear program.

What We Know

As of February 28, 2026, coverage on iaea access iran should prioritize primary documentation and high-credibility reporting. This section focuses on confirmed information and labels uncertainty directly.

• Current reporting on iaea access iran should prioritize named institutional sources and date-labeled updates. IAEA: Iran focus page
• Technical and legal claims are strongest when primary documents and independent reporting align. IAEA: Iran board reports
• Where verification is incomplete, this page labels uncertainty instead of implying certainty. IAEA: Additional Protocol
• Forward-looking sections are conditional and evidence-based, not predictive claims. CRS IF12106
• Internal links connect this page to timeline and hub coverage for continuity. AP: IAEA unable to verify enrichment halt

Analysis

IAEA verification rests on three pillars: material accountancy (measuring and tracking nuclear material), physical containment and surveillance (seals and cameras), and environmental sampling (swipe samples that detect trace particles of nuclear material, even at undeclared locations). When all three are functioning, the Agency can state with high confidence whether a country's nuclear program matches its declarations. When any pillar is compromised, confidence drops sharply.

The current situation in Iran has degraded all three pillars simultaneously. Material accountancy requires inspectors to physically measure stockpiles and verify centrifuge configurations -- impossible when access is denied. Surveillance cameras at Natanz were reportedly destroyed in the strikes, and Iran has not permitted replacement installations. Environmental sampling, which can detect enrichment activity even after equipment is removed, requires inspector presence at the sites in question. Without access, the swipe samples that form the backbone of IAEA detection capability cannot be collected.

A critical concept here is "continuity of knowledge." Once the IAEA's monitoring chain is broken -- whether by strikes destroying cameras, Iran removing equipment, or access being denied -- the Agency cannot retroactively reconstruct what happened during the gap. This means that even if full access is eventually restored, there will be a period for which the IAEA can provide no verification. During previous access disruptions in 2019 and 2021, the Agency warned that gaps exceeding a few weeks would significantly degrade its ability to draw definitive conclusions. The current gap, now measured in weeks with no restoration timeline, already exceeds those thresholds.

It is important to note what IAEA verification cannot do even under optimal conditions. The Agency verifies declared activities at declared sites. Detecting completely undeclared facilities -- especially small-scale or covert enrichment operations -- is far more difficult and depends on intelligence sharing, environmental sampling from wider areas, and the expanded access rights provided by the Additional Protocol (which Iran suspended in 2021). The post-strike environment, with reduced access and broken surveillance chains, makes detection of undeclared activities even less likely.

What's Next

The IAEA verification picture will evolve based on several concrete developments in the coming weeks and months.

• The IAEA Director General's next report to the Board of Governors will formally document which facilities inspectors can access and where gaps remain -- this is the single most important document to watch. IAEA: Iran focus page
• Any agreement between Iran and the IAEA to restore surveillance cameras and seals at Natanz or Fordow would be the first step toward rebuilding continuity of knowledge. IAEA: Iran board reports
• Environmental sampling results from inspections that do occur will reveal whether enrichment levels changed or whether material was moved during the access gap. IAEA: Additional Protocol
• A Board of Governors resolution demanding expanded access or referring the matter to the UN Security Council would signal that the verification gap has reached a politically unacceptable threshold. CRS IF12106
• Independent satellite imagery from commercial providers may partially fill the verification gap by showing construction activity, vehicle movements, or thermal signatures at nuclear sites. AP: IAEA unable to verify enrichment halt

Why It Matters

IAEA access is not a bureaucratic detail -- it is the mechanism that allows the international community to make evidence-based statements about Iran's nuclear program rather than relying on intelligence estimates, political claims, or speculation. Without functioning verification, every assertion about Iran's nuclear status becomes less reliable, regardless of which government or organization is making it.

The stakes of the current verification gap extend beyond Iran. The IAEA safeguards system underpins the entire global nonproliferation regime. If a major verification breakdown in Iran goes unresolved, it sets a precedent that could undermine safeguards credibility worldwide. Other states with nuclear ambitions may conclude that access restrictions during conflict are an effective way to evade monitoring, weakening the norm of international nuclear oversight that has held since the NPT entered force in 1970.

For the immediate crisis, the absence of IAEA verification means that neither optimistic nor pessimistic assessments of the strikes' impact on Iran's nuclear program can be independently confirmed. Governments making decisions about further military action, sanctions, or diplomacy are operating with reduced information quality -- precisely the condition most likely to produce miscalculation.

Related Coverage

• Does Iran Have Nuclear Weapons? What the Evidence Shows
• Additional Protocol: Why Iran Inspections Matter
• NPT Rules and Iran's Obligations Explained
• US Strikes Iran: Full Timeline, Targets, and Global Impact
• War Powers Resolution and Iran Strikes: Congress Response

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.