Can the president attack Iran without Congress?

Under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the president can commit U.S. forces to hostilities without prior congressional approval but must notify Congress within 48 hours. The deployment is limited to 60 days (plus a 30-day withdrawal period) unless Congress authorizes the operation or declares war. The current administration cited Article II commander-in-chief authority but has not requested a formal Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).

What is the War Powers Resolution?

The War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) is a 1973 federal law enacted over President Nixon's veto that governs the relationship between presidential military authority and congressional oversight. It requires the president to consult with and notify Congress before and during military engagements, and limits unauthorized deployments to 60 days to prevent open-ended undeclared wars like Vietnam.

Does Congress need to approve military action against Iran?

The president can initiate military action under Article II authority, but the War Powers Resolution requires congressional authorization to sustain operations beyond 60 days. As of February 2026, bipartisan groups in Congress have introduced competing resolutions — one to retroactively authorize the Iran strikes and another to invoke the War Powers withdrawal mechanism. The 60-day clock makes late April 2026 the statutory deadline for congressional action.

War Powers Resolution: Iran Strikes and Congress

TL;DR

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing U.S. forces to hostilities and limits unauthorized deployments to 60 days (plus a 30-day withdrawal period).
The administration submitted a War Powers notification on February 28, 2026, citing authority under Article II of the Constitution -- but has not requested a formal Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
Bipartisan groups in both chambers have introduced competing resolutions: one to authorize the strikes retroactively, and another to invoke the War Powers Resolution's withdrawal mechanism.
Legal scholars are divided on whether the president's authority as commander-in-chief permits sustained operations against Iran without explicit congressional authorization.
The 60-day clock is now running, making late April 2026 the deadline by which Congress must either authorize the operations or force a withdrawal under the statute.

Overview

The War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), enacted in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, is the principal statute governing the relationship between presidential military authority and congressional oversight. It was designed to prevent the kind of undeclared, open-ended military engagements that characterized the Vietnam War by imposing consultation requirements, notification deadlines, and a time limit on unauthorized deployments. The Iran strikes of February 2026 have brought this law back to the center of constitutional debate.

This article explains how the War Powers Resolution works in practice, what the president is required to do under the statute, what options Congress has to constrain or authorize military operations, and where the current Iran strikes stand on the statutory timeline. It also examines the long history of executive branch challenges to the Resolution's constitutionality and why no president -- from Nixon to the present -- has conceded that the 60-day withdrawal clock is binding.

The stakes are significant: if Congress fails to act within the statutory window, the question of whether the president can sustain combat operations against a sovereign nation without legislative authorization becomes not just a legal debate but a constitutional confrontation with implications for the separation of powers.

What We Know

As of February 28, 2026, coverage on war powers iran strikes should prioritize primary documentation and high-credibility reporting. This section focuses on confirmed information and labels uncertainty directly.

Current reporting on war powers iran strikes should prioritize named institutional sources and date-labeled updates. UN Charter full text
Technical and legal claims are strongest when primary documents and independent reporting align. GovInfo: War Powers Resolution
Where verification is incomplete, this page labels uncertainty instead of implying certainty. CRS IF12106
Forward-looking sections are conditional and evidence-based, not predictive claims. CRS IF11583
Internal links connect this page to timeline and hub coverage for continuity. AP live updates (Feb 28, 2026)

Analysis

The administration's War Powers notification relies on a theory of inherent Article II authority that has been used by presidents of both parties but has never been tested in court in this specific configuration. The notification letter cites the president's constitutional role as commander-in-chief and characterizes the Iran strikes as necessary to protect U.S. personnel and interests in the region. Notably, it does not invoke any existing AUMF -- neither the 2001 authorization targeting al-Qaeda nor the 2002 Iraq AUMF, which was repealed in 2023. This means the legal basis rests entirely on executive authority, a narrower foundation than the one used for most major military operations since 2001.

Congress faces a procedural challenge in responding effectively. Under Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, Congress can pass a concurrent resolution directing the president to withdraw forces. However, since the 1983 Supreme Court decision in INS v. Chadha, which struck down legislative vetoes, the enforceability of concurrent resolutions has been in doubt. A joint resolution -- which requires the president's signature -- is the more legally secure path, but it can be vetoed, requiring a two-thirds supermajority in both chambers to override. This structural imbalance has historically favored the executive branch in War Powers disputes.

The political dynamics in Congress are unusually fractured on this issue. Hawkish members of both parties have signaled support for a new Iran-specific AUMF, but they disagree on scope: some want to limit authorization to defensive strikes on military targets, while others seek broader language that would permit offensive operations against Iran's nuclear program. Meanwhile, a bipartisan antiwar coalition has introduced a privileged War Powers resolution that would force a floor vote within a defined timeline, bypassing committee bottlenecks. The leadership in both chambers has not committed to scheduling either measure.

The 60-day clock presents a hard deadline that previous administrations have circumvented in various ways. In the 2011 Libya campaign, the Obama administration argued that U.S. operations did not constitute "hostilities" under the Resolution because they were limited to airstrikes with no ground troops at risk. A similar argument in the Iran context would be legally tenuous given the scale and intensity of the strikes, but it cannot be ruled out as an executive branch strategy if Congress fails to act before the clock expires in late April 2026.

What's Next

The War Powers timeline creates several concrete decision points in the weeks ahead.

The 60-day statutory clock expires in late April 2026; if Congress has not passed an AUMF or declaration of war by then, the president faces a legal obligation to withdraw forces -- or a constitutional showdown over compliance. GovInfo: War Powers Resolution
Committee markups of competing AUMF proposals could begin as early as mid-March, with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee both signaling intent to hold hearings. CRS IF12106
A privileged War Powers resolution, if introduced under the statute's expedited procedures, could force floor votes in both chambers within 10-15 legislative days, potentially before any AUMF is ready. CRS IF11583
Any expansion of strike targets beyond the initial scope described in the War Powers notification would likely trigger a new notification requirement and restart the political debate over authorization. UN Charter full text
Federal court challenges to the president's Article II authority are possible but historically unlikely to produce timely rulings, as courts have generally treated War Powers disputes as political questions. AP live updates (Feb 28, 2026)

Why It Matters

The War Powers Resolution exists to ensure that the decision to commit American forces to sustained combat is shared between the executive and legislative branches. The Iran strikes represent the most significant test of this framework since the 2011 Libya intervention, and the outcome will set a precedent for how much unilateral military authority future presidents can exercise. If the administration successfully sustains operations past the 60-day mark without congressional authorization, it will further erode the statute's already-weakened constraints on executive war-making.

For Congress, the stakes extend beyond Iran policy. The institution's credibility as a co-equal branch of government on questions of war and peace depends on its willingness to exercise the authorities the War Powers Resolution provides. Decades of congressional inaction on War Powers disputes have created a pattern in which the executive branch treats the statute as advisory rather than mandatory. A decisive vote -- whether to authorize or to withdraw -- would reassert legislative relevance in a domain where it has been steadily declining.

For the public, the War Powers debate determines the level of democratic accountability applied to military operations. Without a congressional vote, there is no formal record of elected representatives endorsing or opposing the strikes. Constituents have no mechanism to hold their representatives accountable on a question that could determine whether the United States enters a prolonged regional conflict. The transparency and deliberation requirements embedded in the War Powers Resolution were designed precisely for moments like this one.

Sources

UN Charter full text. www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
GovInfo: War Powers Resolution. www.govinfo.gov/app/details/COMPS-1508
CRS IF12106. www.congress.gov/crs-products/product/pdf/IF/IF12106
CRS IF11583. www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11583
AP live updates (Feb 28, 2026). apnews.com/article/8de8054f3abd4688f894c657467ee3dd

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.