Iran Nuclear Sites Before and After: What Satellite Imagery and Open-Source Analysis Reveal

Overview

Within six hours of the first confirmed strikes on February 28, 2026, commercial satellite imagery providers began tasking their constellations over Iran's nuclear facilities. The images that have emerged provide the first independent visual evidence of what the strikes accomplished — and what they may not have accomplished. This article presents a facility-by-facility analysis of the damage visible from space, explains the methodology and limitations of open-source satellite imagery analysis, and identifies the critical unknowns that only ground-level inspection can resolve.

Three nuclear sites dominate the analysis: Natanz (Iran's primary centrifuge enrichment facility, located in Isfahan province), Fordow (a hardened enrichment plant built inside a mountain near Qom), and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (which houses the uranium conversion facility, fuel fabrication plant, and nuclear research infrastructure). Each site has a different physical profile, a different vulnerability to aerial attack, and a different role in Iran's nuclear supply chain. Destroying one does not necessarily cripple the program if others remain functional.

Open-source satellite analysis has become a critical tool for verifying government claims about military operations. Neither the Pentagon's statements about precision targeting nor Iran's claims about facility survival can be taken at face value. Satellite imagery provides an independent baseline — imperfect, limited to surface-level observation, but far more reliable than official narratives from either side. This article draws on analysis from established open-source organizations including the Middlebury Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Federation of American Scientists, and independent OSINT analysts with track records in nuclear facility monitoring.

What We Know

The following observations are drawn from commercially available satellite imagery and open-source geospatial analysis published as of February 28, 2026.

• Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (33.724°N, 51.727°E): Pre-strike imagery from February 26 shows an intact facility with normal vehicle traffic patterns and no anomalous activity. Post-strike imagery from February 28 shows complete destruction of the above-ground centrifuge assembly building (Building A, approximately 7,500 square meters), severe damage to the administration complex, destruction of the electrical substation and backup power facilities, and large debris fields extending 200-400 meters from primary impact points. Thermal signatures indicate active fires in at least four structures. The two large underground enrichment halls (Halls A and B) are not directly visible on satellite imagery because they are buried, but surface deformation patterns — including potential subsidence near Hall A's eastern ventilation shaft — suggest that penetrating munitions may have impacted the overburden. Planet Labs satellite imagery
• Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (34.883°N, 51.587°E): Fordow was built inside a mountain specifically to resist aerial attack. Post-strike imagery shows damage to both tunnel entrances (north and south portals), destruction of surface ventilation and cooling infrastructure, and cratering consistent with heavy munition impacts on the mountainside above the facility. However, the rock overburden at Fordow is estimated at 80-90 meters of granite — significantly more than the 60-meter penetration capability of the GBU-57 MOP, even in successive strikes. Open-source analysts assess with moderate confidence that the deepest enrichment halls at Fordow may have survived, though the facility's support infrastructure (power, ventilation, coolant) has been significantly degraded. Maxar Technologies satellite imagery
• Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (32.659°N, 51.679°E): This sprawling complex containing the uranium conversion facility (UCF), fuel fabrication plant, Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), and multiple research buildings shows the most comprehensive surface damage of all three sites. The UCF building — where yellowcake is converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feedstock for centrifuge enrichment — is destroyed. The fuel fabrication plant shows partial structural collapse. Multiple fires are visible. Blast damage extends into the access roads and perimeter security infrastructure. Unlike Natanz and Fordow, Isfahan's nuclear facilities are not underground, making them more vulnerable to conventional aerial strike. Arms Control Association
• Seismic data: The CTBTO's International Monitoring System and regional seismic networks in Turkey, Iraq, and the Caucasus recorded multiple events at Natanz and Fordow with signatures consistent with large conventional detonations and deep-penetrating munition impacts. The seismic signatures at Natanz include low-frequency components that some analysts interpret as evidence of subsurface detonations, though this interpretation is not unanimous. CTBTO
• Radiological monitoring: As of this writing, neither the IAEA's environmental monitoring stations nor the CTBTO's radionuclide detection network has reported elevated radiation levels from any of the strike sites. This suggests that centrifuge cascades containing enriched UF6 were not breached in a manner that released significant radioactive material into the atmosphere — though localized contamination within damaged buildings cannot be ruled out without ground-level monitoring. IAEA

Analysis

Natanz: surface destruction confirmed, underground damage uncertain

Natanz was always the primary target because it houses Iran's largest centrifuge enrichment operation. Before the strikes, Natanz contained an estimated 5,000-6,000 operational IR-6 advanced centrifuges in its underground halls, plus additional IR-1 and IR-2m centrifuges. The above-ground assembly buildings — where new centrifuges were assembled, tested, and prepared for installation — are clearly destroyed. This alone sets back Iran's ability to expand enrichment capacity because centrifuge assembly requires clean-room conditions and precision equipment that takes months to reconstruct.

The underground halls are the critical unknown. The US military possesses the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a 30,000-pound bunker buster designed specifically for deeply buried targets. The MOP can penetrate approximately 60 meters of reinforced concrete or 40 meters of moderately hard rock before detonating. Natanz's underground halls are reported to be 8-10 meters below the surface with reinforced concrete protection — well within the MOP's capability. The surface deformation patterns visible in satellite imagery are consistent with subsurface detonations, but the actual damage to centrifuge cascades, piping, and UF6 containment inside the halls cannot be determined from space.

If the underground halls were successfully penetrated, the damage to active centrifuge cascades would be catastrophic. Centrifuges spin at 60,000-90,000 RPM and are extremely fragile — even the shock wave from a nearby detonation that does not directly hit a centrifuge can destroy it through vibration. The physical destruction of 5,000+ advanced centrifuges would set Iran's enrichment capacity back by 2-4 years, based on estimated centrifuge manufacturing timelines. However, if the overburden absorbed the munitions before they reached the halls, the centrifuges may be damaged but not destroyed, and the setback could be measured in months rather than years.

Fordow: the hardest target, the most uncertain outcome

Fordow represents the most challenging targeting problem in the entire Iranian nuclear complex. Built inside Kuh-e Kolang Gaz mountain with approximately 80-90 meters of granite overburden, the facility was designed from inception to survive aerial bombardment. Even with the GBU-57 MOP, the physics of earth penetration suggest that reaching the deepest enrichment chambers may be impossible with a single weapon. Multiple sequential strikes on the same aimpoint (a technique known as "bore-hole follow-through") can extend penetration depth, and seismic data suggests that multiple heavy munitions were directed at Fordow, but whether sufficient penetration was achieved is genuinely unknown.

What satellite imagery does confirm is that Fordow's surface support infrastructure has been heavily damaged. The tunnel entrances are blocked by debris and cratering. Ventilation shafts — critical for cooling the centrifuges, which generate significant heat during operation — show destruction. The electrical substation providing power to the facility is destroyed. Even if the underground enrichment halls survived structurally intact, operating centrifuges requires continuous power, cooling, and ventilation. Without these support systems, the centrifuges cannot function even if they are physically undamaged. Restoring access, power, and ventilation to a buried facility with blocked entrances is an engineering challenge that could take weeks to months.

Isfahan: comprehensive surface destruction, program-wide implications

The Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center is the most clearly damaged site because its facilities are above-ground and visible. The destruction of the uranium conversion facility (UCF) is strategically significant because it represents a bottleneck in Iran's nuclear supply chain. The UCF converts yellowcake (U3O8) into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas, which is the form required for centrifuge enrichment. Without the UCF, Iran cannot produce new feedstock for its centrifuges. Existing UF6 stockpiles can be enriched, but no new material can be produced until conversion capability is restored.

Rebuilding the UCF is technically achievable — Iran built the original facility with significant Chinese assistance in the early 2000s and possesses the indigenous engineering knowledge to reconstruct it. However, the specialized chemical engineering equipment (fluorination reactors, distillation columns, UF6 handling systems) requires precision manufacturing that Iran's sanctions-constrained industrial base will struggle to source quickly. Estimates for UCF reconstruction range from 12-24 months under sanctions conditions, though clandestine procurement networks could potentially accelerate this timeline.

What satellite imagery cannot tell us

Satellite analysis has clear limitations that must be stated explicitly. It cannot determine: whether enriched uranium stockpiles were dispersed, contaminated, or destroyed; whether centrifuge components (rotors, bearings, molecular pumps) in underground halls were shattered by shock waves; whether Iran has dispersed centrifuge manufacturing capability to undeclared sites that were not targeted; whether the scientific personnel and digital records necessary to rebuild the program survived; or whether Iran had already accumulated sufficient fissile material for a weapon before the strikes. These questions require IAEA inspector access, signals intelligence, and human intelligence sources that are not available in the open-source domain.

What's Next

The damage assessment picture will become clearer over the following timeline, though significant uncertainties will persist for weeks or months.

• Higher-resolution commercial satellite passes (48-72 hours): Maxar's WorldView Legion and Planet's SkySat constellations will provide sub-meter resolution imagery that can identify specific building damage, debris composition (concrete vs. equipment), and recovery activity patterns. Watch for construction equipment or earthmoving machinery appearing at Natanz and Fordow, which would indicate tunnel-clearing and recovery operations. Maxar Technologies
• Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery (24-48 hours): SAR satellites can detect surface deformation and subsidence that may indicate subsurface structural collapse — a potential indicator of successful penetration at Natanz and Fordow. Several commercial SAR providers (ICEYE, Capella Space) are expected to task their constellations over the strike sites. ICEYE SAR
• IAEA access request outcome (days to weeks): The IAEA has formally requested access to all struck nuclear facilities to assess damage and verify the status of nuclear material. Iran's response to this request will be a critical indicator. If Iran grants access quickly, it may indicate confidence that the program retains significant capability. If Iran delays or refuses, it may indicate either severe damage it wants to conceal or a political decision to expel inspectors entirely. IAEA
• Iranian reconstruction activity (weeks to months): Satellite monitoring of the struck sites over the coming weeks will reveal the pace and nature of Iranian reconstruction efforts. Rapid deployment of construction resources to Natanz's underground halls would suggest the halls survived and Iran is prioritizing restoration. Focus on Isfahan UCF reconstruction would suggest that the enrichment feedstock bottleneck is Iran's most urgent concern. Planet Labs
• Radionuclide monitoring (ongoing): The CTBTO's global radionuclide detection network will continue monitoring for any delayed release of radioactive material. Xenon-133, a gaseous fission product, would be the most likely indicator of damage to facilities containing irradiated nuclear material. Its detection in the coming days would suggest that sealed nuclear material was breached during the strikes. CTBTO

Why It Matters

The damage assessment of Iran's nuclear facilities determines whether the strikes accomplished their stated objective — setting back Iran's path to a nuclear weapon by a significant margin — or merely inflicted surface-level damage that Iran can repair within months. This distinction has profound consequences for the entire strategic logic of the operation and the conflict's future trajectory.

If the underground enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow were successfully destroyed, Iran's breakout timeline — the time required to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (approximately 25 kg of 90% enriched U-235) for a single nuclear device — would extend from the pre-strike estimate of weeks-to-months back to 2-4 years. This would represent a strategic achievement comparable to the Stuxnet operation of 2010, which destroyed approximately 1,000 centrifuges and delayed Iran's program by an estimated 1-2 years. The destruction of the Isfahan UCF would add an additional constraint by eliminating Iran's ability to produce new enrichment feedstock.

If, however, the underground halls survived with centrifuge cascades intact or only partially damaged, Iran could potentially resume enrichment operations within weeks to months once power and ventilation are restored. In this scenario, the strikes would have destroyed visible surface infrastructure — creating dramatic satellite imagery — while leaving the core enrichment capability functional underground. This outcome would represent a tactical success but a strategic failure, having incurred the enormous political and diplomatic costs of a military strike without achieving the non-proliferation objective.

Open-source satellite analysis cannot definitively resolve this question, but it provides the best publicly available evidence for assessing which scenario is more likely. The coming days of higher-resolution imagery, SAR analysis, and activity monitoring will progressively narrow the uncertainty — though only IAEA ground access can provide definitive answers.

Related Coverage

• Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan: What Each Nuclear Site Does
• Does Iran Have Nuclear Weapons? Enrichment, Breakout Time & 2026 Status
• Operation Midnight Hammer: Damage Assessment
• IAEA Access After Strikes: What Verification Can Prove
• Uranium Enrichment Levels and Breakout Time Explained

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.