Overview

The question dominating public discussion as US and Israeli aircraft conduct strikes across Iran is straightforward: can Iran shoot down American planes? The answer is nuanced. Iran possesses a layered air defense network that is, by regional standards, sophisticated. It includes the Russian-supplied S-300PMU-2, the indigenous Bavar-373, a network of older Soviet and domestically produced systems, and a surveillance radar network that covers most of the country's airspace. On paper, this represents the most capable integrated air defense system (IADS) the United States has faced since the 1991 Gulf War.

In practice, the picture is considerably less favorable for Iran. US air power in 2026 is built around fifth-generation stealth aircraft — primarily the F-35A Lightning II and the B-2 Spirit strategic bomber — that are specifically designed to penetrate and defeat systems like the S-300. The US also deploys electronic warfare capabilities, stand-off precision munitions, and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine that has been refined through decades of operational experience. The technological gap between Iran's defenses and the attacking force is significant, though not so vast that losses are impossible.

This article provides a detailed, system-by-system assessment of Iran's air defense capabilities, evaluates their performance against the specific aircraft and weapons the US is employing, examines what is known about actual engagement results from the February 28 strikes, and assesses the implications for the trajectory of the air campaign. The analysis draws on publicly available technical specifications, assessments from IISS, Janes, and CSIS, and reporting from the ongoing conflict.

S-300PMU-2 Capabilities

The S-300PMU-2 Favorit is the most capable air defense system in Iran's inventory and represents the backbone of Iran's defense against high-altitude, high-speed aerial threats. Russia delivered four batteries to Iran between 2015 and 2016, following a contract originally signed in 2007 that was delayed by Russian compliance with international sanctions. Each battery consists of a 30N6E2 fire control radar (known as "Flap Lid B"), a 64N6E2 surveillance radar ("Big Bird"), a command post vehicle, and 4-6 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), each carrying four ready-to-fire missiles.

The S-300PMU-2's published performance specifications are formidable:

S-300PMU-2 Technical Specifications
ParameterSpecification
Maximum engagement range200 km (124 miles)
Maximum altitude27 km (88,500 ft)
Simultaneous targets trackedUp to 100
Simultaneous targets engagedUp to 12
Missile types48N6E2 (long range), 9M96E2 (medium range)
Missile velocityMach 6+ (2,000 m/s)
Minimum target RCS (stated)0.02 m²
Reaction time (from detection to launch)~8-10 seconds
Mobility (setup/teardown)~5 minutes

These specifications make the S-300PMU-2 capable, in theory, of engaging high-performance aircraft at considerable range. The system's radar can detect and track conventional (non-stealth) aircraft at ranges exceeding 300 km and engage them at up to 200 km. The missile's Mach 6 velocity gives targets minimal time to execute evasive maneuvers once a missile is in flight. The system's mobility — the ability to relocate within 5 minutes — is designed to defend against SEAD operations that target the radar and launchers.

However, specifications and combat performance are fundamentally different things. The S-300 family has never been tested in combat against a peer adversary. Syria operated the older S-300PM variant, and Israeli aircraft repeatedly struck Syrian targets without confirmed S-300 engagements achieving kills. The gap between test-range performance against cooperative targets and real-world performance against adversaries employing stealth, electronic warfare, and SEAD tactics is historically enormous. According to RUSI analysis, "air defense systems routinely underperform their stated specifications by 50-80% in actual combat conditions, with the degradation driven by electronic countermeasures, doctrine failures, crew proficiency, and the fog of war."

Iran's four S-300PMU-2 batteries are assessed to be positioned to defend the country's most critical assets: Tehran (government and military command), Isfahan (nuclear research and military industrial complex), and the approaches to Natanz and Fordow nuclear facilities. This concentration means that large portions of Iranian territory — including military installations in the south, east, and northeast — fall outside S-300 coverage and are defended only by less capable systems.

Indigenous Bavar-373 System

The Bavar-373 is Iran's most ambitious indigenous air defense system, frequently described by Iranian officials as their answer to the Russian S-300 and potentially comparable to the more advanced S-400 Triumf. The system was first publicly unveiled in August 2019 during a ceremony attended by President Rouhani and has been displayed at multiple military parades since. Iran claims operational deployment of the Bavar-373 at strategic locations, though the exact number of operational batteries and their deployment locations remain classified.

Iran's official claims for the Bavar-373 are ambitious:

The fundamental problem with assessing the Bavar-373 is the absence of independent verification. Iran's claims cannot be confirmed or denied based on available evidence. The system has never been tested in combat. No independent technical analysis of its radar, missile, or fire control capabilities has been published. The technical claims are plausible in the sense that they describe capabilities within the reach of a nation with Iran's engineering talent and access to Russian technology, but "plausible" and "proven" are very different standards.

Several factors create skepticism about the Bavar-373's claimed capabilities. First, Iran's defense industry, while more capable than often credited, has never produced a complex integrated system of this sophistication. The engineering challenges involved in developing a long-range phased array radar, an interceptor missile capable of Mach 6+ performance with active radar homing, and a fire control system that integrates the two are enormous and typically require decades of iterative development. Second, the Sayyad-4 missile has been tested only a handful of times and never against a realistic target. Third, the system's radar — arguably the most critical component — requires semiconductor and signal-processing technology that Iran has historically struggled to produce domestically due to sanctions restrictions on advanced microelectronics.

The Janes assessment of the Bavar-373 concluded that the system "likely provides a genuine medium-to-long-range air defense capability but probably does not match the S-300PMU-2 in either radar sensitivity or missile kinematic performance." If accurate, the Bavar-373 would still represent a meaningful enhancement of Iran's air defense network but would not close the gap against stealth aircraft that the S-300 itself struggles to address.

Radar Network Architecture

Iran's air defense capability depends not just on individual weapon systems but on the integrated air defense system (IADS) that connects surveillance radars, fire control radars, command centers, and weapon systems into a coordinated network. Iran's IADS, known as the Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Base (named after the Prophet Muhammad), was reorganized as an independent military branch in 2008, reflecting the strategic priority Tehran places on air defense.

The surveillance radar network includes a mix of Russian-supplied, domestically produced, and Chinese-origin systems deployed across the country. Key systems include:

The challenge for Iran's radar network is the transition from detection to engagement. Detecting a stealth aircraft on a VHF radar at 200 km provides warning but does not enable a missile shot. That requires a higher-frequency fire control radar (like the S-300's 30N6E2, which operates in the X-band) to provide the precision tracking needed for missile guidance. Stealth aircraft are specifically designed to have extremely low radar cross-sections in these higher frequency bands. The result is a gap: Iran may know that stealth aircraft are approaching but lack the ability to track them precisely enough to engage with missiles until the aircraft are much closer — potentially within the aircraft's own weapons release range.

The IADS command and control network that integrates these radars and weapons is itself a vulnerability. Communications links between radar sites, command posts, and weapon batteries can be disrupted by electronic jamming, cyber attack, or physical destruction. The US has historically prioritized IADS command links as the first targets in air campaigns (as in Iraq 1991 and Libya 2011), and the initial waves of February 28 strikes almost certainly included attacks on Iran's IADS infrastructure. Destruction or disruption of the command network degrades the entire system's effectiveness, even if individual weapon batteries remain physically intact.

Electronic Warfare Limitations

Iran's electronic warfare (EW) capabilities represent one of the most significant gaps in its air defense architecture. While Iran has invested in EW systems — including the Russian-supplied Krasukha-4 ground-based jammer, domestically produced radar warning receivers, and communications jamming equipment — the overall EW capability is assessed to be a generation or more behind the systems deployed by the United States.

The Krasukha-4, delivered by Russia in 2023-2024, is a capable ground-based EW system designed to jam airborne radar (including AWACS-type surveillance radars) and satellite communications within a range of approximately 150-300 km. However, the system is primarily designed for the European theater (specifically to counter NATO E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft) and its effectiveness against the US Air Force's current EW environment — which includes the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, EC-130H Compass Call, and the F-35's integrated electronic warfare suite — is uncertain.

The core problem is that Iran's EW capability is defensive (jamming incoming threats) rather than offensive (degrading the adversary's own electronic systems). The US, by contrast, deploys a comprehensive offensive EW capability specifically designed to blind, confuse, and suppress enemy air defense radars. The EA-18G Growler carries the ALQ-99 and Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) systems, which can locate, identify, and jam specific radar emitters with precision. The F-35's AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare system provides integrated radar warning, electronic support measures, and countermeasure capability at the individual aircraft level. And stand-off jamming from EC-130H aircraft can disrupt Iranian communications and radar from outside missile engagement range.

According to Air Power Australia's assessment, "Iran's ground-based EW capability is sufficient to complicate but not defeat a modern US SEAD campaign. The US maintains a 20-30 year technological lead in airborne electronic warfare, and this advantage is likely decisive in enabling stealth aircraft to operate within the Iranian IADS with acceptable risk."

Performance Against Stealth Aircraft

The central question for Iran's air defense is whether any system in its inventory can detect, track, and engage fifth-generation stealth aircraft — specifically the F-35A Lightning II and the B-2 Spirit strategic bomber.

The F-35A's radar cross-section (RCS) is classified, but publicly available estimates based on published research and comparative analysis place it in the range of 0.001-0.01 m² from the frontal aspect — roughly the radar signature of a metal marble. The B-2's RCS is similarly classified but estimated at approximately 0.001 m² or less. For comparison, a conventional fourth-generation fighter like the F-15E has an RCS of approximately 10 m² — meaning the F-35 presents a radar target roughly 1,000-10,000 times smaller.

The S-300PMU-2's stated minimum detectable RCS is 0.02 m² — significantly larger than the F-35's estimated frontal RCS. This means that under ideal conditions (no jamming, no clutter, perfect radar maintenance), the S-300's fire control radar would struggle to detect an F-35 at ranges beyond approximately 30-50 km, well within the F-35's weapons release envelope. The F-35 can launch Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) from 24-28 km and Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) from up to 110 km, meaning it can strike targets defended by S-300 before the S-300 can engage.

The situation is even more challenging for Iran when considering the B-2's operational profile. The B-2 operates at high altitude (above 40,000 feet) and carries stand-off weapons including the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (designed specifically for deeply buried targets like Fordow) and JASSM-ER cruise missiles with a range of 1,000+ km. The B-2 can release weapons from well beyond the S-300's engagement envelope while remaining undetectable to fire control radar.

Iran's VHF-band radars (Nebo SVU, if operational) offer a partial solution to the stealth detection problem. VHF wavelengths (1-2 meters) are comparable in size to certain features of stealth aircraft, creating resonance effects that increase the effective RCS. This can allow VHF radars to detect stealth aircraft at ranges of 100-200 km. However, VHF radar provides low-resolution tracking that cannot guide a missile to intercept. The tactical value is limited to providing early warning and cueing higher-frequency radars to search specific sectors of sky — but those higher-frequency radars may still not achieve the lock needed for missile guidance until the target is dangerously close.

Known Engagement Results

As of the latest reporting on February 28, 2026, no confirmed successful Iranian air defense engagements against US or Israeli aircraft have been verified. The Pentagon stated that "all aircraft involved in the initial strike waves returned safely to their operating bases" and that "Iranian air defense presented minimal effective opposition." Israel's military spokesperson made similar claims regarding Israeli Air Force operations.

Iran's state media, through IRIB and the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, claimed that air defense forces "engaged and destroyed multiple hostile aircraft and cruise missiles." Specific claims include the interception of "at least 12 cruise missiles" by S-300 and Bavar-373 batteries defending Isfahan and Tehran, and the "downing of 3 aircraft" in western Iran. However, no wreckage, debris, or independent evidence supporting these claims has emerged. Iranian state media has a well-documented history of inflating defensive claims: in January 2020, after the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani and Iran's retaliatory missile strikes on Al Asad Air Base, Iran initially claimed to have killed 80 US troops (the actual number of casualties was zero fatalities and approximately 100 traumatic brain injuries).

What can be assessed with higher confidence is that Iran's air defenses launched missiles during the initial strike waves. Open-source video from Tehran and Isfahan shows what appear to be surface-to-air missile launches, and US military officials acknowledged that "Iranian air defense systems were active and engaged." The distinction between "engaged" (launched missiles) and "engaged effectively" (hit targets) is critical. Iraqi air defenses launched thousands of missiles during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion without shooting down a single US combat aircraft in the latter conflict.

It is also probable that US SEAD operations targeted and destroyed some Iranian air defense assets in the early hours of the campaign. Standard US doctrine calls for the first wave of an air campaign to prioritize air defense suppression using AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles (which home in on radar emissions), Tomahawk cruise missiles targeting known fixed radar sites, and F-35s employing SDBs against mobile SAM launchers identified through signals intelligence. The destruction of even a few S-300 batteries or their associated radars would significantly degrade Iran's already-limited capability against subsequent strike waves.

Comparison to Iraqi Air Defenses (2003)

The most relevant historical comparison for Iran's air defense challenge is Iraq's IADS during the 2003 invasion. Iraq in 2003 operated what was, on paper, a formidable air defense network: hundreds of SAM batteries (SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-13), thousands of anti-aircraft artillery pieces, and an integrated command and control network — augmented by the experience of having survived the devastating 1991 air campaign and 12 years of subsequent no-fly zone enforcement.

The result was catastrophic for Iraq. The US lost zero fixed-wing combat aircraft to Iraqi air defenses during the entire invasion. One F/A-18C was lost to ground fire (possibly a shoulder-fired missile or anti-aircraft artillery), and several aircraft were damaged, but the integrated air defense system was rendered operationally irrelevant within the first 48 hours through a combination of SEAD operations, electronic warfare, and stealth.

Iraq 2003 vs. Iran 2026: Air Defense Comparison
FactorIraq 2003Iran 2026
Most capable SAM systemSA-6 Gainful (35 km range)S-300PMU-2 (200 km range)
Stealth aircraft in threatB-2, F-117B-2, F-35A, F-22A
IADS command resilienceDegraded by 12 years of strikesIntact at campaign start
EW capabilityNegligibleLimited (Krasukha-4)
VHF radar (anti-stealth)Limited (P-18 Spoon Rest)Nebo SVU, indigenous VHF
Terrain advantageFlat desertMountainous (limits radar coverage)
Area to defend438,000 km²1,648,000 km²

Iran's air defenses are quantitatively and qualitatively superior to Iraq's in 2003. The S-300PMU-2 is a genuine long-range threat that Iraq entirely lacked. Iran's VHF radar capability provides some detection against stealth that Iraq could not achieve. Iran's mountainous terrain creates radar shadows and dead zones that aircraft can exploit but also complicates low-level penetration. And Iran's IADS was intact at campaign start, unlike Iraq's which had been degraded by 12 years of continuous enforcement operations.

However, the attacking force is also significantly more capable than in 2003. The F-35A, which did not exist in 2003, represents a quantum leap over the F-117 in stealth performance, sensor capability, and electronic warfare integration. The F-22A, also unavailable in 2003, provides air superiority with stealth that no Iranian interceptor can match. Stand-off munitions have dramatically increased in range and precision. And US electronic warfare capability has advanced enormously in the intervening 23 years.

The net assessment, based on the Iraq comparison, is that Iran's air defenses will perform better than Iraq's (which set an extremely low bar) but will likely prove insufficient to prevent the US from achieving air superiority over contested Iranian airspace within the first 72-96 hours of operations. The S-300 may achieve isolated engagements against non-stealth aircraft or cruise missiles, but the system is unlikely to impose attrition rates that would affect the US campaign's operational viability.

Russian Resupply Question

One of the most consequential variables for the trajectory of Iran's air defense capability is whether Russia will resupply Iran with additional or more advanced systems during the conflict. The system most frequently discussed is the S-400 Triumf, which represents a significant upgrade over the S-300PMU-2 in every performance parameter: longer range (400 km with the 40N6 missile), improved detection against low-observable targets, faster reaction time, and more sophisticated electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).

Russia has the S-400 in production and has exported it to Turkey, China, and India. The system is available for rapid delivery if Moscow decides to provide it. The strategic logic for Russia is compelling: providing Iran with enhanced air defense would impose greater costs on the US campaign, demonstrate the value of Russian military equipment to potential export customers, and deepen the Russia-Iran strategic relationship. The February 28 strikes have almost certainly generated urgent Iranian requests for S-400 systems through diplomatic channels.

However, several factors constrain Russia's willingness to deliver advanced air defense systems during active conflict. First, providing weapons that shoot down American aircraft would represent a qualitative escalation in the US-Russia confrontation that Moscow may not be willing to risk while simultaneously managing the Ukraine conflict. Second, the logistics of delivery are complicated by the conflict itself: air delivery into Iran is risky, and overland routes through the Caucasus or Central Asia are circuitous. Third, S-400 systems require trained crews and integration with existing IADS infrastructure — a process that takes months under normal conditions and would be extraordinarily difficult during active hostilities. Fourth, Russia has deployed the majority of its S-400 production to defend its own territory and operations in Ukraine, limiting available stocks for export.

The IISS assessment concluded that "emergency Russian delivery of S-400 systems to Iran is technically possible but operationally improbable within the timeframe of the current campaign's critical phase. Even if systems were delivered, integrating them into Iran's damaged IADS and training crews to operational proficiency would require weeks to months, by which time the US will likely have established the air superiority needed to neutralize the systems before they become operational."

Layered Defense Strategy

Iran's air defense doctrine is built around the principle of layered defense: multiple overlapping systems of varying capability that force attacking aircraft to navigate through successive threat rings. Even if no single system can defeat a stealth aircraft, the cumulative effect of multiple threat layers increases the probability of engagement and imposes operational constraints on the attacker.

The layers, from outermost to innermost, are:

The layered approach has merit but faces two fundamental problems. First, the outer layers (S-300, Bavar-373) are the most capable but also the most vulnerable to SEAD targeting. Destruction of even a few long-range batteries during the campaign's opening hours dramatically degrades the entire defensive architecture. Second, the inner layers (Tor-M1, MANPADS, AAA) can defend against aircraft that penetrate close to their targets but cannot engage stand-off weapons (cruise missiles, glide bombs) released from beyond their range. Modern US doctrine specifically emphasizes stand-off engagement to avoid inner-layer defenses, and the proliferation of long-range precision munitions makes this approach increasingly effective.

Gap Analysis

A comprehensive assessment of Iran's air defense reveals several critical gaps that the US campaign is almost certainly exploiting.

Anti-stealth capability gap: Iran has no system proven to detect, track, and engage stealth aircraft at tactically relevant ranges. VHF radars provide detection but not engagement-quality tracking. The S-300's fire control radar cannot reliably track targets with RCS below 0.02 m² at useful ranges. This gap means that F-35 and B-2 operations can proceed with low risk of engagement, particularly when operating at altitude and employing their own electronic warfare suites.

Electronic warfare gap: Iran's limited offensive EW capability means it cannot degrade the adversary's sensor and communications environment to the same degree that US EW assets degrade Iran's. This asymmetry is compounding: US jamming reduces the effectiveness of Iranian radar, while Iranian jamming has minimal effect on US aircraft sensors and targeting systems.

Geographic coverage gap: Iran's territory is vast (1.648 million km²), and its long-range air defense inventory is limited to 4 S-300 batteries plus an unknown number of Bavar-373 batteries. This creates significant gaps in coverage, particularly in eastern and southern Iran, through which aircraft can route around defended areas. The US has extensive intelligence on radar coverage patterns (from satellite monitoring and signals intelligence) and can plan flight routes that exploit gaps.

Sustainability gap: Iran's missile inventory for its most capable systems is finite and cannot be replenished quickly. Each S-300 battery carries approximately 16-24 ready missiles. Once expended, reloading requires time and logistical support. If Iran fires missiles defensively at a high rate to engage multiple threats, it risks exhausting its most capable munitions within the first days of the campaign, leaving only less capable systems for subsequent defense.

Integration gap: The destruction of IADS command links in the opening hours of the campaign fragments the defensive network into isolated batteries operating independently. Independent batteries can still launch missiles but lose the benefit of centralized radar data, threat prioritization, and coordinated engagement — significantly reducing the system's overall effectiveness. The CSIS Missile Defense Project assessment estimated that "destruction of Iran's IADS command layer reduces the overall defensive system's effectiveness by 60-70%, even if individual weapon batteries remain physically intact."

Implications for US Air Campaign

The net assessment of Iran's air defense capabilities suggests that the US will achieve and maintain effective air superiority over most Iranian territory within the first 48-96 hours of sustained operations. This does not mean zero risk to US aircraft — losses are possible, particularly from:

For the broader air campaign, the implication is that the US can sustain strike operations at a tempo and scale determined primarily by munitions availability, basing constraints, and political decisions rather than by Iranian defensive effectiveness. This is consistent with the pattern of every US air campaign since 1991: after an initial SEAD phase, air operations proceed with minimal interference from enemy air defenses. The exception would be if Russia provides advanced systems (S-400, advanced EW) that fundamentally change the equation — a possibility that, while technically feasible, faces the strategic and logistical constraints described above.

Iran's air defense, while insufficient to prevent the US from achieving its objectives, is not strategically irrelevant. It forces the US to expend significant resources on SEAD operations that might otherwise be directed at primary targets. It imposes operational constraints (altitude restrictions, route planning, timing) that slow the tempo of operations. And it creates the ever-present possibility of aircraft losses that, even in small numbers, carry disproportionate political and psychological impact. Iran's air defense cannot win the air war, but it can impose costs and complications that affect how quickly and decisively the US achieves its campaign objectives.

Sources

  1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "The Military Balance 2026: Iran Chapter." www.iiss.org
  2. Janes Defence, "Iran Air Defence Assessment: S-300PMU-2 and Bavar-373 Operational Analysis," January 2026. www.janes.com
  3. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Missile Defense Project, "Iran's Integrated Air Defense Network: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities," February 2026. missilethreat.csis.org
  4. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), "Air Defence Effectiveness in Modern Conflict: Historical Performance vs. Stated Specifications," November 2025. rusi.org
  5. Air Power Australia, "Assessing Iran's IADS Against Fifth-Generation Threats," December 2025. www.ausairpower.net

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.