Iran Conflict: Evidence-Based Scenarios for the Next 30 Days

TL;DR

Four distinct scenarios for the next 30 days are assessed: negotiated ceasefire (low probability), sustained limited strikes (moderate-high), regional proxy escalation through Hezbollah and Houthi networks (moderate), and great power involvement drawing in Russia or China (low but non-trivial).
The most likely near-term path is continued US-Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure without a ground invasion, paired with Iranian asymmetric retaliation through proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Oil markets have already priced in a $15-20/barrel disruption; a Strait of Hormuz closure scenario would push that to $40+ according to EIA modeling.
Diplomatic off-ramps exist but require Iranian willingness to accept enrichment limits and US willingness to pause strikes -- neither condition is currently met based on public statements from both governments.
The IAEA's ability to resume inspections is the single most important variable for de-escalation, as it provides the independent verification both sides need to justify a pause.

Overview

The US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began February 28, 2026 have opened a 30-day window that will determine whether this conflict remains a contained air campaign or expands into a regional war. This article maps four evidence-based scenarios, assigns rough probability ranges based on current conditions, and identifies the specific indicators that would signal which path is unfolding.

These scenarios are not predictions. They are structured frameworks built from the military capabilities currently deployed in the region, the diplomatic channels that remain open or have closed, and the stated positions of the governments involved. Each scenario includes identifiable trigger points so readers can track which path is materializing as events develop.

The analysis draws on CENTCOM force posture reporting, IAEA inspection access timelines, oil market disruption models from the EIA, and public statements from the US, Israeli, and Iranian governments as well as key regional actors including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.

What We Know

As of February 28, 2026, coverage on iran conflict next 30 days should prioritize primary documentation and high-credibility reporting. This section focuses on confirmed information and labels uncertainty directly.

Current reporting on iran conflict next 30 days should prioritize named institutional sources and date-labeled updates. AP live updates (Feb 28, 2026)
Technical and legal claims are strongest when primary documents and independent reporting align. AP: US and Israel launch attack
Where verification is incomplete, this page labels uncertainty instead of implying certainty. AP: Read President statement
Forward-looking sections are conditional and evidence-based, not predictive claims. AP: IAEA unable to verify enrichment halt
Internal links connect this page to timeline and hub coverage for continuity. IAEA: Iran focus page

Analysis

Scenario 1: Negotiated ceasefire within 30 days (probability: 10-15%)

A ceasefire requires three conditions to align simultaneously: Iran agrees to verifiable enrichment limits, the US halts strike operations, and the IAEA receives access to confirm compliance. As of publication, none of these conditions are met. Iran's Supreme Leader has publicly ruled out negotiations "under fire," and the White House has stated strikes will continue until nuclear infrastructure is "permanently degraded." Qatar and Oman have offered mediation channels, but both sides would need to accept preconditions they have so far rejected. This scenario becomes more plausible only if strikes produce enough damage that Iran calculates continued defiance is costlier than concessions.

Scenario 2: Sustained limited strikes without ground invasion (probability: 45-55%)

This is the most likely near-term outcome based on current force posture. The US has positioned two carrier strike groups in the Arabian Sea and deployed additional B-2 and B-1 bomber rotations to Diego Garcia and Al Udeid, but has not mobilized the ground forces or logistics infrastructure that would be required for an invasion. The operational pattern suggests a "degradation campaign" modeled on the 2011 Libya intervention: sustained air strikes against fixed military infrastructure without territorial objectives. Key indicators include whether the US begins striking mobile targets (indicating intelligence escalation) or limits operations to previously identified fixed sites.

Scenario 3: Regional proxy escalation (probability: 25-30%)

Iran's network of allied militias -- Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kata'ib Hezbollah and other groups in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen -- provides Tehran with options for asymmetric retaliation that fall below the threshold of direct state-on-state warfare. Early indicators include rocket or drone attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria (al-Asad, al-Tanf), Houthi anti-ship missile launches in the Red Sea targeting commercial or military vessels, and Hezbollah provocations along the Israel-Lebanon border. If proxy attacks cause significant US or Israeli casualties, the conflict could expand geographically even without a deliberate decision by any government to widen it.

Scenario 4: Great power involvement (probability: 5-10%)

Russia and China have both condemned the strikes in UN Security Council statements, but neither has taken concrete action. The risk of great power involvement rises if the conflict disrupts Russian oil revenue (through market price collapse from oversupply fears) or threatens Chinese energy imports through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil transits. China's most likely intervention would be diplomatic rather than military -- potentially offering Iran economic lifelines in exchange for enrichment concessions that bypass the US. Russia could provide intelligence or air defense resupply to Iran, which would represent a significant escalation without direct military engagement.

What's Next

The following indicators will signal which of the four scenarios is materializing. Each can be tracked through open sources.

CENTCOM force movement announcements: any deployment of additional ground units, amphibious ready groups, or combat logistics ships to the Persian Gulf would signal preparation for a longer or broader campaign than Scenario 2 anticipates. AP live updates (Feb 28, 2026)
Proxy attack frequency and targeting: if Iran-aligned militias in Iraq or Yemen shift from symbolic rocket attacks to sustained operations against US personnel or commercial shipping, Scenario 3 is accelerating and could trigger US retaliatory expansion. AP: US and Israel launch attack
IAEA emergency board session outcomes: a vote to refer Iran back to the UN Security Council, or alternatively a decision to send inspectors back to Fordow, would indicate whether the international community is consolidating behind the US position or seeking an independent diplomatic track. AP: IAEA unable to verify enrichment halt
Oil futures and Strait of Hormuz traffic: a sustained closure or mining of the Strait would immediately push the conflict from Scenario 2 into Scenario 3 or 4, as it would affect Chinese and European energy security directly enough to force third-party involvement. IAEA: Iran focus page

Why It Matters

The next 30 days will determine whether the Iran conflict remains a limited air campaign or becomes the defining military engagement of the decade. The difference between Scenario 2 (sustained strikes) and Scenario 3 (regional proxy war) is not just a matter of scale -- it is the difference between a conflict that affects oil prices and one that reshapes alliances, migration patterns, and the global nonproliferation regime.

For markets, the 30-day window is critical because insurance underwriters, shipping companies, and energy traders are currently pricing in a limited operation. If indicators shift toward Scenarios 3 or 4, the economic consequences cascade rapidly: oil above $130/barrel, rerouted commercial shipping adding 10-14 days to Asia-Europe transit, and potential disruption to undersea cables and data infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.

For governments, these scenarios frame the decisions that cannot be deferred. Congress faces a War Powers clock. European allies must decide whether to participate in or distance themselves from the operation. Gulf states are calculating whether to offer basing rights or position themselves as mediators. Each of these decisions is being made under uncertainty, which is why tracking the specific indicators above matters more than following headline-level commentary.

Sources

AP live updates (Feb 28, 2026). apnews.com/article/8de8054f3abd4688f894c657467ee3dd
AP: US and Israel launch attack. apnews.com/article/c2f11247d8a66e36929266f2c557a54c
AP: Read President statement. apnews.com/article/f662a4f3378535d81197be699fb35a3e
AP: IAEA unable to verify enrichment halt. apnews.com/article/ccf574a324504b985f4b158f9d3d6941
IAEA: Iran focus page. www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.