Gulf States Response to Iran Attacks: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Regional Calculations

Overview

The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council -- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman -- sit at the geographic and strategic center of the US-Iran conflict. They host the majority of America's military infrastructure in the Middle East, share a maritime border with Iran across the Persian Gulf, depend on the Strait of Hormuz for their oil exports, and have spent decades navigating between their security dependence on Washington and their geographic proximity to Tehran. The February 2026 strikes have forced each of them into an acutely uncomfortable position: too close to the United States to credibly distance themselves from the operations, and too close to Iran to safely endorse them.

This article examines how each major Gulf state is responding to the crisis, the strategic calculations driving their positions, the vulnerabilities that Iran could exploit in retaliation, and the implications for regional stability. The Gulf states' responses are not merely diplomatic footnotes to the US-Iran confrontation -- they will shape the trajectory of the conflict, because the military operations being conducted against Iran depend on infrastructure located on Gulf state territory, and any Iranian retaliation that crosses Gulf state borders would fundamentally transform the scope of the war.

What We Know

Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom issued a Foreign Ministry statement within hours of the first strikes calling for "maximum restraint by all parties" and urging "an immediate return to diplomatic channels to resolve differences." Notably, the statement did not name the United States or characterize the strikes as aggression -- a carefully constructed omission that avoids antagonizing Washington. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly spoke by phone with both US and Iranian officials in the first 24 hours, positioning Saudi Arabia as a potential mediator rather than a belligerent. Saudi Arabia's diplomatic rapprochement with Iran, formalized in the March 2023 Beijing Agreement that restored relations after a seven-year rupture, has created a new dynamic: Riyadh has diplomatic channels to Tehran that did not exist during previous escalation cycles, and it has strong incentives to prevent those channels from collapsing.

Saudi Arabia hosts approximately 2,500 US military personnel at Prince Sultan Air Base south of Riyadh, which serves as the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) backup and hosts US Patriot missile batteries and fighter squadrons. The Kingdom has not publicly confirmed whether US aircraft participating in Iran strikes operated from Saudi territory, and is unlikely to do so. The 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais attacks, which temporarily knocked out 5.7 million barrels per day of Saudi oil production, remain a vivid reminder of the Kingdom's vulnerability to Iranian precision strikes.

United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi's response has been the most diplomatically layered among the GCC states. The Foreign Ministry statement called for "de-escalation and the protection of civilian life" while emphasizing the UAE's commitment to "regional stability and the rule of international law." The UAE has simultaneously maintained commercial ties with Iran -- Dubai remains one of Iran's most important trade and financial conduits, with bilateral trade estimated at $15-20 billion annually -- and deepened its military relationship with the United States, France, and Israel. The UAE hosts approximately 3,500 US military personnel at Al Dhafra Air Base, which operates F-35s, surveillance aircraft, and tanker assets that are integral to regional operations. The Houthi missile and drone attacks on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, which struck near Al Dhafra and hit an ADNOC fuel depot, demonstrated the UAE's exposure to proxy retaliation.

Qatar. Qatar occupies the most structurally contradictory position of any GCC state. It hosts Al Udeid Air Base, which serves as the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Combined Air Operations Center from which all US air operations in the Middle East are coordinated. Approximately 10,000 US military personnel are stationed at Al Udeid. At the same time, Qatar maintains closer diplomatic and economic relations with Iran than any other GCC state, sharing the world's largest natural gas field (South Pars/North Dome) across their maritime border and having maintained diplomatic relations with Tehran throughout periods when other Gulf states severed ties. Qatar's public statement called for "immediate de-escalation and a return to dialogue," with the Foreign Minister separately offering Doha as a venue for mediation talks. Qatar's strategy is to leverage its relationships with both sides to position itself as an indispensable intermediary -- the same role it has played in Afghan Taliban negotiations and other conflicts.

Bahrain. The smallest GCC state hosts the US Fifth Fleet headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain, home to approximately 9,000 US military personnel. Bahrain has historically been the most hawkish GCC state toward Iran, partly because of its Sunni monarchy's longstanding tensions with its majority-Shia population, which Manama accuses Tehran of attempting to mobilize. Bahrain's statement expressed "understanding" for "actions taken to address threats to regional security" -- the closest any GCC state came to explicit support for the strikes. Bahrain's vulnerability is acute: it is the smallest and most geographically exposed of the Gulf states, and its critical infrastructure is within range of even short-range Iranian rockets.

Kuwait. Kuwait hosts approximately 13,000 US military personnel across Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and other facilities. Despite this significant US military presence, Kuwait has maintained a more cautious diplomatic posture than Bahrain, calling for "restraint and respect for international law." Kuwait's parliament, which has more legislative independence than other Gulf legislatures, includes vocal critics of foreign military basing, and the government must balance security cooperation with domestic political sensitivities. Iraqi militia groups aligned with Iran have previously threatened Kuwait-based US installations, creating a proxy risk vector that does not require direct Iranian military action.

Oman. Oman has historically served as a quiet diplomatic back-channel between Iran and the West, having facilitated the secret talks that led to the JCPOA. Sultan Haitham bin Tariq's government has called for "immediate cessation of military operations and a return to peaceful resolution of disputes." Oman does not host significant US combat forces (though it provides access to military facilities under a 2019 agreement) and maintains the warmest relations with Iran of any GCC state. Oman's strategic value in the current crisis lies in its potential role as a mediator -- a function it has performed repeatedly over the past two decades.

Analysis

The Gulf states face a structural dilemma that no amount of diplomatic language can resolve: they cannot simultaneously host the military infrastructure being used to attack Iran and credibly position themselves as neutral parties. Iran knows which bases host American aircraft, where CENTCOM's command center operates, and which Gulf states' airspace is being used for strike sorties. The question is whether Tehran chooses to treat this as a basis for retaliation against Gulf state territory -- a decision that would dramatically escalate the conflict but is not without precedent, given the 2019 Abqaiq attacks and the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi.

The Saudi calculus. Saudi Arabia's strategic position has shifted fundamentally since the 2023 Beijing Agreement restored relations with Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has invested significant diplomatic capital in the rapprochement, which was partly motivated by the desire to end the Yemen war (a Saudi-Iranian proxy conflict) and partly by a broader recognition that the Kingdom's Vision 2030 economic transformation cannot succeed in a region destabilized by perpetual conflict. The US strikes threaten to unravel this diplomatic architecture. If Saudi Arabia is perceived as having facilitated the strikes -- whether or not it actually did -- the rapprochement with Iran collapses, and the Kingdom reverts to the adversarial posture that prevailed from 2016 to 2023. If Saudi Arabia is perceived as having obstructed the strikes or distanced itself from the US, it risks damaging the security relationship that remains the foundation of its defense policy. MBS is attempting to thread this needle by positioning Saudi Arabia as a mediator, but the margin for error is vanishingly thin.

The Qatar paradox. Qatar's position is the most structurally untenable. It is physically impossible for CENTCOM to conduct major operations against Iran without using Al Udeid -- the base is the nerve center of US air operations in the entire region. Iran is fully aware of this. Qatar's strategy of maintaining friendly relations with both Washington and Tehran was viable during periods of managed tension, but it becomes logically contradictory during active military operations. The fact that Qatar's public statements have tilted toward mediation and de-escalation, while its territory is being used for strike coordination, creates a credibility gap that Iran can exploit politically. The risk for Qatar is that Tehran decides to make an example of this contradiction -- not necessarily through a direct military attack on Qatari territory, which would be strategically reckless, but through diplomatic pressure, economic threats regarding the shared gas field, or proxy operations designed to demonstrate that Qatar cannot credibly serve two masters.

The proxy spillover risk. The most probable threat to Gulf state security is not a direct Iranian military attack but the activation of proxy forces that can strike Gulf-linked targets while providing Tehran with plausible deniability. The Houthi movement in Yemen has demonstrated the ability to launch ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and explosive drones at Saudi and UAE targets, with improving accuracy and range. Iraqi militias aligned with Iran have rocket and drone capabilities that can reach US installations in Kuwait and potentially threaten Kuwait's own infrastructure. These proxy capabilities allow Iran to impose costs on Gulf states without crossing the threshold of a direct state-on-state attack, which would trigger US defense obligations and risk catastrophic escalation. The challenge for Gulf state defense planners is that proxy attacks are harder to deter, harder to attribute with certainty, and harder to defend against than conventional military threats.

The energy market dimension. Gulf states are acutely aware that any disruption to their oil and gas production or export infrastructure -- whether from direct Iranian strikes, proxy attacks, or Strait of Hormuz interdiction -- would have cascading global economic consequences. While higher oil prices benefit producers in the short term, the Gulf states' long-term economic strategies depend on a reputation for stability and reliability. A perception that Gulf oil infrastructure is vulnerable to Iranian attack would accelerate the energy transition away from fossil fuels, undermine sovereign wealth fund investments, and damage the Gulf states' efforts to attract foreign direct investment and tourism. This economic calculus reinforces the preference for de-escalation, even among Gulf states that privately welcome the degradation of Iran's military capabilities.

What's Next

Several developments will determine whether the Gulf states can maintain their balancing acts or are drawn more deeply into the conflict.

• Houthi activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is the most immediate threat indicator. Any escalation in Houthi attacks on shipping, particularly targeting Saudi or UAE-flagged vessels or ports, would signal that Iran is using its Yemeni proxy to pressure Gulf states. The US and UK have conducted strikes against Houthi infrastructure in Yemen since 2024; an escalation of these operations would further implicate Gulf states by association.
• Iraqi militia movements and rhetoric toward Kuwait-based US forces represent a second proxy escalation vector. Iran-aligned groups such as Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have previously claimed rocket attacks on US installations in Iraq and could extend operations toward Kuwait if directed by Tehran.
• Oman's diplomatic back-channel will be closely watched. If Muscat is hosting quiet talks between US and Iranian intermediaries -- as it did before the JCPOA -- it would signal that both sides are at least exploring off-ramps. The absence of such activity would suggest the crisis is still in an escalatory phase.
• Saudi Arabia's diplomatic engagement with both Washington and Tehran will set the tone for the broader GCC response. If MBS succeeds in maintaining the rapprochement with Iran while preserving the US security relationship, it could provide a model for regional de-escalation. If forced to choose sides, Saudi Arabia's choice would reshape Gulf security architecture for years to come.
• Energy market disruptions -- even minor ones such as insurance premium increases for Gulf-bound tankers or brief production pauses at vulnerable facilities -- would generate economic pressure for de-escalation that could influence Gulf state diplomacy more powerfully than any political consideration.

Why It Matters

The Gulf states matter to the Iran conflict not merely as geography but as political actors whose decisions will shape whether the war remains contained or spreads. If Gulf states actively facilitate US military operations while maintaining the fiction of neutrality, they provide the logistical foundation for a sustained campaign but risk becoming targets of Iranian retaliation. If they restrict US access to their bases and airspace -- which some have threatened in past crises -- they could effectively veto the scale of operations Washington can conduct. If they succeed in positioning themselves as mediators, they could provide the diplomatic infrastructure for a ceasefire or negotiated settlement that neither Washington nor Tehran can propose directly.

For global energy markets, the Gulf states' exposure to the conflict is the single most important variable determining whether the US-Iran confrontation triggers an oil price shock or remains a contained geopolitical event. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar collectively produce approximately 20 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and supply the majority of the world's liquefied natural gas. Any disruption to these supplies -- whether from direct attacks, infrastructure shutdowns, or Strait of Hormuz closure -- would produce economic consequences far exceeding the military costs of the conflict itself.

For the international order, the Gulf states' responses test whether the post-Cold War model of US security guarantees in exchange for energy market stability remains viable when the guarantee requires those same states to serve as platforms for military operations against their neighbor. The tension between security dependence and sovereign interest has always existed in Gulf-US relations, but the February 2026 strikes have exposed it in a way that demands resolution. How that resolution unfolds will determine the future of US military posture in the Middle East and the Gulf states' own calculations about whether American protection is worth its price.

Related Coverage

• Iran Retaliation: US Bases Targeted
• Regional Proxy Escalation Routes After Iran Strikes
• Strait of Hormuz Shipping Risk Scenarios
• Oil Price Shock After Iran Strikes Explained
• Iran Conflict: Evidence-Based Scenarios for the Next 30 Days

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.