Iran Retaliates Against US Bases: Which Military Facilities Were Targeted and What We Know

Overview

Hours after the United States and Israel launched a coordinated wave of airstrikes against Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure on the morning of February 28, 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) executed what it called “Operation True Promise III”—a barrage of ballistic missiles fired at four American military installations spread across the Persian Gulf. The attacks began at approximately 9:15 PM local Gulf time and continued for roughly 45 minutes, with missiles arriving in staggered waves at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and Naval Support Activity Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet.

The scale and geographic breadth of the retaliation set it apart from anything Tehran had previously attempted. In June 2025, Iran’s response to Operation Midnight Hammer was limited to a single target—Al Udeid Air Base—with advance warning that allowed evacuation. In January 2020, following the killing of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani, Iran fired missiles at a single US base in Iraq. The February 28 operation involved no advance warning, no diplomatic back-channels, and no single point of focus. Instead, the IRGC launched from at least five separate firing positions inside Iranian territory, according to initial satellite imagery reviewed by open-source intelligence analysts, directing missiles along distinct trajectories toward four countries simultaneously.

The shift from calibrated, signaled retaliation to a multi-front, unannounced attack reflects a fundamental change in Tehran’s strategic calculus. Iranian state media quoted IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh as stating that the operation was designed to demonstrate that “no American installation within 2,000 kilometers of Iran is beyond our reach, and the era of striking Iran without consequence has ended.” The Pentagon confirmed the attacks within 30 minutes of the first impacts and announced that CENTCOM had activated its full theater missile defense posture.

What We Know: Base-by-Base Breakdown

1. Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

Role: Al Udeid is the crown jewel of the American military presence in the Middle East. Located approximately 20 miles southwest of Doha, it hosts the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), the nerve center from which the US Air Force directs every air combat mission across the CENTCOM area of responsibility—spanning 20 countries from Egypt to Kazakhstan. The base houses approximately 10,000 US military personnel and supports operations by the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing. B-52 Stratofortress bombers, KC-135 tankers, RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drones, and C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft have all operated from its runways in recent deployments.

What happened: Al Udeid received the heaviest concentration of incoming fire. CENTCOM confirmed that between 12 and 16 ballistic missiles were directed at the base in two waves separated by approximately 18 minutes. Patriot PAC-3 batteries operated by both US and Qatari forces engaged the incoming missiles. Multiple intercepts were confirmed visually by residents in Doha, who reported seeing bright flashes and hearing concussive booms across the southern sky. However, at least two warheads penetrated the defense umbrella, with one impacting the southern taxiway and another striking a hardened aircraft shelter on the western perimeter. A secondary fire was reported but contained within 90 minutes.

Qatar’s Emiri Air Force activated its own National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) alongside US Patriot batteries, marking the first confirmed combat employment of NASAMS on Qatari soil. The Qatari government issued a statement condemning the attack as a “violation of Qatar’s sovereignty” while calling for an immediate ceasefire from all parties.

2. Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait

Role: Ali Al Salem has served as the primary staging area for US forces rotating into and out of the Middle East theater since the early 2000s. Located in the Kuwaiti desert roughly 40 miles west of Kuwait City, the base functions as a transit hub—thousands of US troops pass through its processing centers en route to deployments across the region. It also supports reconnaissance and combat search-and-rescue operations. At any given time, between 3,000 and 5,000 US military personnel are present at the facility.

What happened: Ali Al Salem received an estimated 6 to 8 ballistic missiles, arriving approximately 12 minutes after the first wave struck Al Udeid. The base’s Patriot batteries, operated by the 1st Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, engaged all incoming threats. Initial reports from Kuwaiti civil defense authorities indicated that at least one missile fragment landed inside the base perimeter following a mid-course intercept, causing minor structural damage to a logistics staging area. No warehouse fires or fuel depot strikes were confirmed in the first hours after the attack.

Kuwait’s Ministry of Defense placed the country’s armed forces on the highest alert status and temporarily closed all airspace over the country. The Kuwaiti government summoned the Iranian ambassador to deliver what it described as “the strongest possible protest.”

3. Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates

Role: Al Dhafra, situated on the outskirts of Abu Dhabi, is one of the most technologically advanced US facilities in the Gulf. It is the forward operating location for F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters, F-22 Raptors, and high-altitude surveillance platforms including the U-2 Dragon Lady and MQ-9 Reaper drones. The base also hosts the only permanently deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in the region, positioned specifically to defend against Iranian ballistic missile threats. Approximately 3,500 US personnel are stationed there alongside UAE Air Force units.

What happened: Al Dhafra was struck by an estimated 8 to 10 missiles, including what analysts believe were Emad precision-guided variants based on trajectory data. The THAAD battery stationed at the base engaged multiple threats at high altitude, with intercepts confirmed at altitudes above 150 kilometers—well within THAAD’s designed engagement envelope. Patriot PAC-3 batteries provided lower-tier defense. The UAE’s own Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense systems also activated, the first time the Russian-built system and the American THAAD operated simultaneously in a combat environment.

Despite the layered defense, fragments from at least one intercept caused damage to an aircraft maintenance hangar. The UAE’s state news agency WAM reported “no civilian casualties” from the attack but confirmed that Abu Dhabi International Airport was temporarily diverted to Al Maktoum International in Dubai as a precautionary measure. The UAE Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling the missile strikes “a grave escalation that threatens regional stability.”

4. US Fifth Fleet Headquarters, Naval Support Activity Bahrain

Role: NSA Bahrain, located in the Juffair district of Manama, serves as the headquarters for the US Fifth Fleet, which commands all American naval operations across the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. The facility is both a command center and home port for a rotating complement of destroyers, patrol craft, and mine countermeasure vessels. Approximately 8,000 US military and civilian personnel work at the installation, making it the largest overseas US naval facility in the region.

What happened: NSA Bahrain received at least 5 missiles, with 3 confirmed impacts within the broader base complex. Unlike the desert-based airfields, NSA Bahrain is embedded within the urban fabric of Manama, which raised immediate concerns about collateral damage to civilian areas. Patriot batteries stationed at nearby Shaikh Isa Air Base provided primary defense, but the short flight time from Iranian launch sites to Bahrain—estimated at under 8 minutes for short-range ballistic missiles—compressed the engagement window significantly.

One missile struck a pier area near the waterfront, damaging port infrastructure but missing the destroyer berths. Another impacted a support building in the eastern section of the compound. Bahraini civil defense authorities reported shattered windows and minor structural damage in adjacent residential neighborhoods from blast overpressure. The Bahraini government, which hosts the US naval presence under a decades-old defense cooperation agreement, declared the attack “an act of aggression against the Kingdom of Bahrain” and recalled its ambassador from Tehran.

Missile Defense Response

The simultaneous activation of missile defense systems across four Gulf states was unprecedented. The architecture tested on February 28 included:

• THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense): Deployed at Al Dhafra, engaged targets in their terminal descent phase above 150 km altitude. This was the first confirmed multi-engagement combat use of THAAD against live ballistic missile threats.
• Patriot PAC-3: The workhorse of the defense, with batteries at all four targeted locations. Patriot engaged threats at lower altitudes after THAAD interceptions or as primary defense where THAAD was absent. PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill technology—kinetic impact rather than explosive fragmentation.
• AN/TPY-2 radar: Forward-deployed X-band radar provided tracking data that was shared across the entire CENTCOM theater defense network in real time, allowing missile defense coordination across all four target areas.
• Allied systems: Qatar’s NASAMS, the UAE’s Pantsir-S1, and Bahrain’s point defense systems supplemented US-operated batteries, creating the first genuinely multinational missile defense engagement in the Gulf.

CENTCOM stated that “the majority of incoming threats were successfully engaged” but declined to provide specific interception rates. The Pentagon confirmed that casualty figures were “still being assessed” but indicated that early reports suggested “no mass casualty event” at any of the four installations.

Analysis

A Deliberate Break from the Calibrated Playbook

The most striking feature of Iran’s February 28 retaliation is how sharply it departs from Tehran’s established pattern of signaled, limited responses. In January 2020, after the US killed Soleimani, Iran fired 10 ballistic missiles at Ain al-Asad Air Base in Iraq but provided advance warning through Iraqi intermediaries. The result was dramatic television footage, domestic political satisfaction in Tehran, and zero American fatalities. In June 2025, Iran repeated the formula at Al Udeid—warning Qatar and the US, allowing evacuations, and ultimately causing only minor damage when a single missile struck a radar dome.

February 28 broke this pattern completely. No warning was given. Four countries were hit simultaneously. The targeting included a naval headquarters embedded in a populated city. The IRGC framed the operation not as a proportional response but as a demonstration of strategic reach. According to CSIS analyst Fabian Hinz, the decision to strike across four countries indicates that “Iranian leadership has concluded that the old rules of calibrated escalation no longer apply—either because they believe deterrence requires a stronger signal, or because domestic pressure for a forceful response has become impossible to manage.”

Iran’s Missile Arsenal: What Was Fired

Based on flight trajectory data, debris analysis, and IRGC statements, analysts assess that Iran employed a mix of the following systems:

• Shahab-3 / Ghadr-110: Medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges of 1,300–1,950 km. The Ghadr-110 is a Shahab-3 variant with a smaller, maneuverable reentry vehicle designed to complicate missile defense intercepts. Likely used against Al Udeid (approximately 300 km from Iranian launch sites across the Gulf) and Al Dhafra (roughly 250 km).
• Emad: Iran’s first precision-guided ballistic missile, capable of maneuvering during reentry with a reported circular error probable (CEP) of 500 meters. The Emad was almost certainly used against Al Dhafra and NSA Bahrain, where targeting accuracy matters most given the proximity to civilian infrastructure.
• Fateh-110 / Fateh-313: Solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles with ranges of 300–500 km. Their solid propellant allows rapid launch preparation—minutes rather than the hour-plus required for liquid-fueled Shahab variants. Likely fired at Ali Al Salem and NSA Bahrain, both within Fateh range from western Iranian launch sites.
• Dezful: An extended-range variant of the Fateh family with a reported 1,000 km range. May have been used against the more distant Kuwaiti target from launch positions in central Iran.

The Institute for the Study of War estimated that Iran fired between 31 and 40 ballistic missiles in total across all four targets. If accurate, this represents a substantial expenditure from Iran’s operational missile inventory but still a fraction of the estimated 3,000+ missiles in the country’s total arsenal—suggesting Tehran deliberately held capability in reserve.

The Strategic Calculus: Why Four Countries

Targeting US installations in four separate Gulf states was not militarily necessary. Iran could have concentrated all 30+ missiles on a single base and overwhelmed its defenses through saturation. The decision to spread fire across Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain was a political choice with three distinct objectives:

1. Demonstrating reach: By striking in all four countries, Iran proved that its missile force can engage targets across the entire western Persian Gulf littoral simultaneously. This complicates US defense planning enormously—defending four bases requires four times the missile defense assets of defending one.
2. Testing host-nation resolve: Every missile that lands on Qatari, Kuwaiti, Emirati, or Bahraini territory forces those governments to confront whether hosting American forces makes them safer or more vulnerable. Iran is betting that at least some Gulf states will quietly pressure Washington to reduce its military footprint rather than absorb repeated attacks.
3. Fracturing the Gulf coalition: The Gulf states are not monolithic. Qatar has maintained closer ties with Iran than the UAE or Bahrain. Kuwait has historically pursued strict neutrality. By attacking all four simultaneously, Iran eliminates the option for any single state to claim it was spared due to its diplomatic relationship with Tehran—potentially driving a wedge between those who want confrontation and those who seek accommodation.

Comparison to Ain al-Asad (2020)

The January 8, 2020 attack on Ain al-Asad Air Base in Iraq remains the closest historical analogue, but the differences are more instructive than the similarities:

Factor	Ain al-Asad (Jan 2020)	Feb 28, 2026
Advance warning	Yes (via Iraq)	None confirmed
Targets	1 base, 1 country	4 bases, 4 countries
Missiles fired	~16	31–40 (estimated)
Missile types	Fateh-313, Qiam-1	Shahab-3, Emad, Fateh-110, Dezful
Host nation sovereignty	Iraq (accepted US presence reluctantly)	4 Gulf allies (formal basing agreements)
De-escalation signal	Iran declared “concluded”	IRGC warned of “further waves”

The 2020 attack was designed to end the cycle of escalation. Iran declared the operation “concluded” within hours and signaled through Swiss intermediaries that it sought no further conflict. On February 28, 2026, the IRGC issued no such signal. Instead, Hajizadeh stated that the initial strikes were “the first phase of a response that will continue until the aggression ceases,” leaving the door open for sustained operations.

What This Means for Host Nations

The Gulf states now face the most uncomfortable security dilemma since the 1991 Gulf War. Hosting US forces has long been rationalized as a guarantee of security—American military presence deters aggression, and in return, Gulf nations receive advanced weapons sales and security commitments. February 28 inverted that logic: for the first time, these countries absorbed missile strikes specifically because they host American installations.

The immediate diplomatic fallout has been telling. Qatar, which has invested heavily in balancing its US military relationship with diplomatic ties to Iran, issued its strongest condemnation of Tehran in years. The UAE, which had been normalizing relations with Iran after the Abraham Accords, recalled its charge d’affaires. Kuwait, historically the most cautious Gulf state on matters involving Iran, summoned the Iranian ambassador and temporarily suspended all flights to and from Iranian cities. Bahrain, which already has the most adversarial relationship with Iran among the Gulf states, declared the attack “an act of war” and placed its military under joint operational command with US forces.

What’s Next

The situation remains fluid and dangerous. These are the specific indicators that analysts are monitoring in the hours and days ahead:

• CENTCOM damage and casualty assessment: The Pentagon has stated that full assessments are ongoing. Confirmed US casualties would dramatically increase pressure for an immediate American counterstrike. The absence of casualties, as in 2020, would provide political space for a more measured response.
• Base operational status: Whether Al Udeid’s CAOC remains operational is the single most important military question. If the Combined Air Operations Center was degraded, the US loses its ability to coordinate air operations across the entire Middle East theater—a contingency that would require shifting command to alternative facilities.
• Iran’s next signal: The IRGC’s framing of the attacks as “Phase One” could be either a genuine threat of follow-on strikes or negotiating leverage designed to extract a ceasefire. Watch for statements from the Iranian Foreign Ministry (which typically signals de-escalation) versus the IRGC (which controls the missile force). Divergence between these two power centers would indicate internal debate in Tehran about whether to escalate or off-ramp.
• Gulf state diplomatic responses: If any host nation formally requests the US to reduce or relocate its military presence, it would represent a strategic victory for Iran that no number of intercepted missiles could offset. Early statements suggest solidarity with Washington, but private diplomatic channels may tell a different story.
• Strait of Hormuz activity: IRGC Navy movements in the Strait are being tracked in real time by US reconnaissance assets. Any mine-laying operations, fast-boat surges, or naval exercises in the Strait would signal that Iran is preparing to escalate beyond missile strikes to economic warfare.
• Proxy activation: Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have the capability to launch rocket and drone attacks against US forces at shorter range. If these groups begin striking American positions in tandem with IRGC missile volleys, the conflict expands from a bilateral US-Iran confrontation into a regional war.

Why It Matters

The February 28 missile strikes represent a threshold event in Middle Eastern security. Three dimensions of this attack have no precedent and reshape the strategic landscape going forward.

First, the simultaneity. Iran has never before attacked American military facilities in multiple countries at the same time. The 2020 Ain al-Asad strike was contained to Iraq. The June 2025 Al Udeid strike was contained to Qatar. On February 28, four sovereign nations absorbed Iranian ballistic missile fire within a 45-minute window. This is no longer a bilateral US-Iran military confrontation—it is a regional conflict involving the territorial integrity of Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

Second, the absence of warning. Iran’s previous retaliatory strikes were preceded by back-channel communications that allowed evacuations and minimized casualties. That restraint served both sides: Iran got its domestic credibility, and the US avoided casualties that would demand massive retaliation. The elimination of that safety mechanism means that future exchanges carry a far higher risk of mass casualties on either side—and with mass casualties come political pressures that make de-escalation exponentially harder.

Third, the stress test on the basing model. The United States maintains approximately 45,000 military personnel across the Gulf states under a network of bilateral defense agreements. That presence has been justified as stabilizing—a deterrent against regional aggression. If hosting American forces now means absorbing ballistic missile strikes from Iran, the political calculus for every Gulf capital changes. Even if the military relationship survives in the short term, the long-term viability of the US forward-basing posture in the Gulf is now an open question in a way it has not been since the end of the Cold War.

The coming 48 to 72 hours will determine whether February 28 becomes a waypoint toward de-escalation or the opening chapter of a wider war. The historical record offers little comfort: every previous cycle of US-Iran military escalation eventually stabilized, but each cycle reached a higher peak of violence than the one before. This one has already surpassed all predecessors.

Related Coverage

• US Strikes Iran: Full Timeline, Targets, and Global Impact
• Iran’s Response to US Strikes: Retaliation and Fallout
• Iran Missile Range Map: What the Ranges Mean
• Regional Missile Defense Systems in the Middle East
• Iran Conflict: Evidence-Based Scenarios for the Next 30 Days
• U.S. Military Begins 'Major Combat Operations in Iran,' Trump Says

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.