Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, and the Axis of Resistance: Iran's Proxy Network Explained

Overview

Iran's most consequential strategic asset is not a missile, a nuclear centrifuge, or an air defense system — it is a network of allied armed groups that extends Iran's military reach across an arc stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. This network, which Iran and its allies call the "Axis of Resistance" (in Farsi: Mehvar-e Moqavemat), provides Tehran with something no amount of conventional military spending could buy: the ability to threaten adversaries, impose costs, and shape regional politics across seven or more countries simultaneously, without risking a single member of the Iranian regular military.

Understanding this network is essential for understanding the current conflict. When the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, they were striking a country whose retaliatory options extend far beyond its own borders. Hezbollah can launch rockets at Israel. Houthis can attack shipping in the Red Sea. Iraqi militias can target American troops at Al-Asad Air Base. These are not hypothetical capabilities — they have all been demonstrated in combat, in some cases within the last 24 hours. The proxy network is the mechanism through which a US-Iran conflict becomes a regional war, and its activation is already underway (CSIS, "Iran's Network of Influence," 2025).

This article maps the full network: who the groups are, what they can do, how they are funded and armed, who coordinates them, and what role they are playing in the current crisis. The picture that emerges is of a sophisticated, resilient, and operationally active alliance system that gives Iran strategic depth unmatched by any other Middle Eastern state.

What Is the Axis of Resistance

The Axis of Resistance is the term used by Iran and its allies to describe the loose alliance of state and non-state actors united by opposition to Israel, US military presence in the Middle East, and the regional order dominated by Gulf Arab monarchies. The concept has ideological roots in Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and its founding principle of exporting revolutionary values, but in practice the alliance is more strategic than sectarian. While most groups in the network are Shia Muslim, Iran also supports Sunni organizations (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad) when it serves strategic goals, demonstrating that the axis is defined by political alignment rather than purely religious solidarity.

The axis operates on a hub-and-spoke model with Tehran (specifically the IRGC Quds Force) at the center. Iran provides funding, weapons, training, intelligence, and strategic guidance to allied groups, which in return advance Iranian interests in their respective countries, create deterrence against Israeli and American military action, and provide Iran with the ability to escalate or de-escalate across multiple fronts simultaneously. The degree of Iranian control varies significantly by group — Hezbollah has the closest relationship and highest degree of integration with Iranian command structures, while the Houthis operate with greater autonomy, and Hamas maintains an independent chain of command despite accepting Iranian weapons and funding.

Group	Country	Est. Fighters	Key Capability	Iran Control Level
Hezbollah	Lebanon	30,000-50,000	150,000+ rockets/missiles, PGMs	Very High
Ansar Allah (Houthis)	Yemen	100,000-200,000	Anti-ship missiles, drones, ballistic missiles	Medium
Hamas	Gaza/West Bank	25,000-40,000	Rockets, tunnels, infantry	Low-Medium
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Gaza	8,000-12,000	Rockets, guided missiles	Medium-High
Kata'ib Hezbollah	Iraq	15,000-20,000	Rockets, drones, IEDs	High
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq	Iraq	10,000-15,000	Rockets, EFPs, political influence	High
Harakat al-Nujaba	Iraq/Syria	5,000-10,000	Militia operations, Syrian deployment	Very High
Fatemiyoun Division	Afghanistan (ops in Syria)	10,000-20,000	Infantry, Syrian combat experience	Very High
Zainebiyoun Brigade	Pakistan (ops in Syria)	1,000-5,000	Infantry, Syrian combat experience	Very High

Hezbollah in Lebanon

Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God") is the crown jewel of Iran's proxy network — the most capable, most experienced, and most strategically important non-state armed group in the Middle East. Founded in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War with direct IRGC support, Hezbollah has evolved from a guerrilla organization into a hybrid entity that simultaneously functions as a political party (with seats in Lebanon's parliament), a social service provider, and a military force more powerful than the Lebanese national army (Wilson Center, "Hezbollah: From Militia to Political Party," 2024).

Hezbollah's military wing maintains an estimated 30,000-50,000 fighters, including a core of full-time professional soldiers with extensive combat experience from the Syrian civil war (where Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters to support the Assad regime from 2012 onward) and the 2006 war with Israel. The group's fighters are better trained, better equipped, and more experienced than those of most conventional Arab armies.

The group's most consequential capability is its rocket and missile arsenal. Western intelligence estimates consistently place the total at 150,000 or more rockets, missiles, and other projectiles — making Hezbollah's stockpile larger than that of most nation-states. This arsenal ranges from short-range Katyusha-type rockets (20-40 km) that were the primary weapon in the 2006 war, through medium-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets (45-75 km), to the strategically significant Fateh-110 and Zelzal ballistic missiles (200-300 km) that can reach Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport, and Israel's Dimona nuclear facility. Most critically, Iran has transferred precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and guidance kits that convert unguided rockets into weapons accurate enough to strike specific buildings, military installations, or infrastructure targets — a qualitative leap that Israeli military planners describe as a top-tier strategic threat.

Hezbollah also operates anti-ship cruise missiles (it famously struck the Israeli corvette INS Hanit with a C-802 missile during the 2006 war), UAVs (including Iranian-supplied Ababil and Shahed variants capable of reconnaissance and attack missions), and an extensive tunnel network along the Israeli-Lebanese border designed for cross-border infiltration operations. Its intelligence apparatus, supported by Iranian signals intelligence, has demonstrated the ability to penetrate Israeli communications and provide tactical warning to military commanders.

In the context of the current conflict, Hezbollah represents Iran's most powerful deterrent against Israel. The group has placed its forces on maximum alert since the initiation of Operation Epic Fury, and Israeli military intelligence has reported extensive movement of mobile missile launchers to concealed launch positions in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. A full-scale Hezbollah rocket barrage against Israel would overwhelm the Iron Dome system through sheer volume and force Israel to fight on two fronts simultaneously — the northern border and the ongoing Iran campaign.

Houthis in Yemen

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah ("Supporters of God"), are a Zaidi Shia movement that has controlled much of northern Yemen including the capital Sana'a since 2014. The group's relationship with Iran is more complex than a simple proxy arrangement — the Houthis have indigenous roots, local grievances, and a significant degree of operational autonomy. However, Iranian support in the form of weapons, training, intelligence, and financial assistance has dramatically upgraded the Houthis' military capabilities, transforming them from a tribal militia into a force capable of threatening international shipping and striking targets over 1,500 km away (CFR, "The Houthi-Iran Connection," 2025).

The Houthis' most consequential capability for the current conflict is their demonstrated ability to threaten commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Since November 2023, Houthi forces have attacked dozens of commercial vessels using a combination of anti-ship ballistic missiles (modified Iranian designs), anti-ship cruise missiles (based on Iranian C-802 variants), one-way attack drones (Shahed-136 derivatives), and explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels (USVs). These attacks have disrupted approximately 12-15% of global shipping that normally transits the Suez Canal, forcing major container lines to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope at enormous cost — estimated at $10-15 billion in additional annual shipping expenses.

Houthi ballistic missile capability has expanded significantly. The group has fired modified Burkan (based on Iranian Qiam-1) ballistic missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia and, more recently, has claimed strikes against Israeli targets at ranges exceeding 1,500 km — including the port of Eilat and Ben Gurion Airport. Iran's support for the Houthis also includes advanced drone technology: the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, using a combination of Quds-1 cruise missiles and delta-wing drones, demonstrated the ability to strike hardened industrial targets with tactical precision from Yemeni territory.

For the current conflict, the Houthis represent Iran's ability to impose economic costs on the global system. Escalated attacks on Red Sea shipping, potential strikes against Saudi and Emirati oil infrastructure, and the diversion of US naval resources to deal with Houthi threats all serve Iran's strategic interest in making the conflict as expensive and multi-fronted as possible for the US-led coalition. The US has already diverted the destroyer USS Carney (DDG-64) and other surface combatants to Red Sea patrol duties, drawing naval assets away from the primary Iran theater.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) represent Iran's foothold in the Palestinian arena. The relationship is notable because Hamas is a Sunni Muslim organization rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood tradition — ideologically distant from Iran's Shia theocracy. Yet strategic alignment against Israel has sustained the partnership for decades, with Iran providing weapons, funding, and technical assistance that have materially enhanced both organizations' military capabilities (USIP, "Iran and Palestine," 2024).

Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, maintained an estimated 25,000-40,000 fighters in Gaza prior to the October 2023 conflict with Israel and the subsequent Israeli military operation that devastated much of Gaza's infrastructure. Iran provided Hamas with rocket technology (the M-75 and J-80 rockets were based on Iranian Fajr-5 designs), guidance kit technology, drone components, and — critically — the financial support that allowed Hamas to divert domestic resources toward military preparation while Iranian funds covered social services. The IRGC Quds Force also provided training to Hamas fighters, including the tunnel construction techniques that became central to Hamas's military strategy.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad maintains a closer relationship with Iran than Hamas does. PIJ is smaller (estimated 8,000-12,000 fighters) but more directly responsive to Iranian direction. PIJ has served as an alternate channel when Iran-Hamas relations have experienced friction — as they did during the Syrian civil war when Hamas initially sided with the Syrian opposition against Iran's ally Assad. PIJ's rocket capability, while smaller in scale than Hamas's, includes Iranian-supplied precision-guided variants that can strike specific targets within Israel.

In the context of the current conflict, Hamas and PIJ's operational status is significantly degraded by the ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza. However, both organizations maintain networks in the West Bank, and Iran's broader strategy includes potential activation of third-front operations against Israel from the Palestinian territories, adding to the pressure from Hezbollah in the north and direct Iranian missile strikes.

Iraqi PMF and Hashd al-Shaabi

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as Hashd al-Shaabi, are a coalition of predominantly Shia militia groups in Iraq that were formally organized in 2014 to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) but have since become a permanent — and politically powerful — feature of Iraq's security landscape. The PMF is officially part of Iraq's security forces and reports to the Prime Minister, but the most powerful component militias maintain parallel chains of command leading to Iran's IRGC Quds Force.

The most significant Iran-aligned PMF factions include:

• Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH): The most capable and closely Iran-aligned Iraqi militia, with an estimated 15,000-20,000 fighters. KH has conducted hundreds of rocket and drone attacks against US military positions in Iraq and Syria since 2019, using 107mm and 122mm Katyusha rockets, Iranian-supplied Ababil drones, and more recently one-way attack drones based on Shahed designs. The group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department in 2009.
• Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH): A political-military organization led by Qais al-Khazali, with 10,000-15,000 fighters and significant political representation in Iraq's parliament. AAH was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on US forces during the Iraq War, including the January 2007 Karbala provincial headquarters attack that killed five American soldiers.
• Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba: A smaller but highly ideological group led by Akram al-Kaabi, who has sworn personal allegiance to Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. Nujaba has deployed fighters to Syria and has threatened to attack US forces in the region.
• Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: A group closely aligned with Kata'ib Hezbollah that has operated in both Iraq and Syria.

The Iraqi militia network is Iran's most direct tool for threatening US military personnel in the region. The approximately 2,500 American troops stationed in Iraq at Al-Asad Air Base, Erbil, and other locations are within easy rocket and drone range of militia positions. Since October 2023, these militias have conducted over 170 attacks against US facilities in Iraq and Syria, using increasingly sophisticated weapons including one-way attack drones that are difficult to detect and intercept. The January 2024 drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan, attributed to Kata'ib Hezbollah, killed three US service members — the first American combat fatalities from Iran-aligned proxy attacks in the current escalation cycle (Stanford CISAC, "Mapping Militant Organizations: Iraq," 2025).

Afghan and Pakistani Shia Militias

The lesser-known components of Iran's proxy network include Shia militias recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan and deployed primarily to Syria to support the Assad regime. These groups — the Fatemiyoun Division (Afghan) and Zainebiyoun Brigade (Pakistani) — represent Iran's ability to mobilize fighters from Shia populations across the wider region, exploiting poverty, refugee status, and sectarian solidarity to build military formations under IRGC command.

The Fatemiyoun Division (also spelled Fatemiyun) is composed primarily of Afghan Shia Hazara fighters, many recruited from the large Afghan refugee population in Iran (estimated at 2-3 million). At peak deployment in Syria, the Fatemiyoun reportedly fielded 10,000-20,000 fighters, making it one of the largest foreign contingents in the Syrian conflict after Hezbollah. Fighters were motivated by a combination of religious ideology (defending Shia shrines in Syria), economic incentives (monthly salaries of $500-1,000, far exceeding Afghan wages), and the promise of Iranian residency permits for themselves and their families. The IRGC trained Fatemiyoun fighters in camps in Iran before deploying them to Syria, and the division fought in major battles including the campaigns for Aleppo, Palmyra, and Deir ez-Zor.

The Zainebiyoun Brigade (also Zeinabiyoun) is the Pakistani equivalent — composed of Pakistani Shia fighters, predominantly from the Parachinar region and Karachi's Shia communities. Smaller than the Fatemiyoun (estimated 1,000-5,000 fighters), the Zainebiyoun has nonetheless participated in Syrian combat operations and represents Iran's reach into Pakistan's Shia population.

Both groups have largely withdrawn from Syria following the reduction in active combat there, but the IRGC maintains organizational structures, training relationships, and the ability to re-mobilize these fighters if needed. In a scenario where Iran faces a ground threat, these battle-hardened formations could be redeployed to Iranian territory for territorial defense — a reserve of combat-experienced infantry that supplements Iran's regular forces and IRGC.

Funding Flows and Weapons Pipelines

The proxy network's effectiveness depends on two critical enablers: money and weapons. Iran maintains sophisticated systems for both, operating largely outside the international financial system and using both land and maritime routes to move arms to allied groups across the region.

Funding estimates vary significantly by source, but the consensus range suggests Iran spends $1-2 billion annually on proxy group support. The largest single recipient is Hezbollah, which receives an estimated $700 million to $1 billion per year from Iran — covering salaries for fighters, social services for Hezbollah-affiliated communities in Lebanon, weapons procurement, and infrastructure development. Houthi funding is harder to quantify but is estimated at $100-200 million annually in direct transfers plus the value of weapons supplied. Iraqi militias receive varying levels of support, with Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq each receiving tens of millions of dollars per year. Hamas received an estimated $70-100 million annually from Iran prior to October 2023, though this figure has fluctuated based on the state of the relationship.

The weapons pipeline to these groups operates through multiple channels. For Hezbollah, the primary route runs through Syria — Iranian weapons are flown to Damascus International Airport or the T-4 (Tiyas) air base, then transported overland to Hezbollah positions in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes against these transfers (the so-called "war between wars" or MABAM campaign), but the sheer volume of traffic makes complete interdiction impossible. For the Houthis, weapons are smuggled by sea — small dhows and fishing vessels carry missile components, drone parts, and other materiel from Iranian ports to the Yemeni coast, with the vast maritime space of the Arabian Sea making interception difficult despite US and coalition naval patrols. Iraqi militia weapons flows are simpler — Iran shares a 1,458 km border with Iraq, and the political influence of Iran-aligned factions within the Iraqi government limits enforcement of restrictions on arms transfers.

Iran also provides technical assistance that may be more valuable than the weapons themselves. IRGC engineers and advisors help proxy groups establish indigenous production capacity for rockets, drones, and explosive devices. Hezbollah has developed the ability to manufacture precision-guided rockets in underground facilities in Lebanon. Houthis have established drone assembly lines using Iranian-supplied components. This technology transfer strategy means that even if supply lines are disrupted, allied groups retain some ability to produce weapons independently.

IRGC Quds Force Command

The Quds Force (Niru-ye Qods, "Jerusalem Force") is the IRGC's external operations division and the organizational hub of Iran's entire proxy network. Responsible for "extraterritorial operations" — meaning all Iranian military and intelligence activity outside Iran's borders — the Quds Force functions as a combination of special operations command, intelligence agency, diplomatic service, and military aid organization.

The Quds Force is currently commanded by Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, who assumed the position in January 2020 following the US assassination of his legendary predecessor, Major General Qasem Soleimani, in a drone strike at Baghdad International Airport. Soleimani had commanded the Quds Force for over two decades and was personally credited with building the proxy network into its current form — negotiating alliances, directing military operations in Iraq and Syria, and maintaining personal relationships with leaders of allied groups from Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah to various Iraqi militia commanders.

Qaani's leadership style differs from Soleimani's. Where Soleimani was charismatic, highly visible, and personally present on battlefields, Qaani is described by analysts as more bureaucratic, less personally engaged with proxy leaders, and more focused on the eastern theater (Afghanistan and Pakistan, his area of expertise before assuming command). Some assessments suggest that the proxy network's coordination has suffered under Qaani's leadership, with groups operating with greater autonomy and less strategic coherence. However, the institutional structures Soleimani built — training programs, funding channels, weapons pipelines, intelligence sharing mechanisms — continue to function regardless of the commander's personal style.

The Quds Force's estimated personnel strength of 15,000-20,000 includes officers deployed as advisors and liaison personnel with every major proxy group, intelligence operatives conducting clandestine operations worldwide, and specialized units handling weapons logistics and financial transfers. The force maintains a sophisticated communications network linking Tehran to proxy group commanders across the region, enabling coordination of operations across multiple fronts — exactly the kind of coordination being tested in the current multi-theater escalation.

Current Operational Status

As of February 28, 2026, every major component of Iran's proxy network has been placed on heightened operational alert in response to Operation Epic Fury. The evidence of activation is visible across multiple theaters:

Lebanon/Hezbollah: Israeli military intelligence has reported significant movement of Hezbollah military assets, including mobile rocket launchers, to forward positions in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah's Secretary-General has issued a public statement declaring the organization's readiness to "respond to aggression against the Islamic Republic." Israeli forces along the northern border have been placed on maximum alert, with additional Iron Dome batteries repositioned to the north. The IDF has recalled reservists assigned to northern defense formations.

Yemen/Houthis: Houthi forces have escalated attacks on Red Sea shipping within hours of the US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Ansar Allah's military spokesman declared that "all American and Israeli vessels in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean are now legitimate targets." At least two additional anti-ship missile launches were detected by US naval forces within 12 hours of Operation Epic Fury's initiation.

Iraq/PMF Militias: Kata'ib Hezbollah and allied militias launched a coordinated rocket and drone barrage against US positions at Al-Asad Air Base and the Erbil diplomatic compound within hours of the Iran strikes. The umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility and promised "continuous operations until American forces leave Iraqi soil." The Iraqi government has called for restraint but has not moved to prevent militia operations, reflecting the political influence Iran-aligned factions hold in Baghdad.

Syria: Iran-aligned militias in eastern Syria have increased surveillance and probing attacks against the US garrison at Al-Tanf and the positions held by US-allied Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria. The approximately 900 US troops in Syria are in a particularly exposed position, surrounded by both Iran-aligned and Russian-backed forces.

Coordination With Iranian Strikes

A key question is whether proxy group operations are independently initiated in solidarity with Iran or centrally coordinated by the IRGC Quds Force as part of a unified retaliatory strategy. The evidence suggests elements of both.

The timing of proxy attacks — multiple groups in multiple countries attacking within hours of the US strikes on Iran — indicates at minimum advance planning and pre-positioned forces. This level of readiness cannot be improvised; it requires weeks of preparation including ammunition stockpiling, target selection, communications protocols, and political authorization. The IRGC Quds Force almost certainly issued contingency orders to proxy groups in the days or weeks before February 28, directing them to prepare retaliatory operations to be executed upon receipt of a specific signal or upon confirmation of US strikes against Iran.

However, the scale and targeting of individual proxy operations appear to be locally determined. Hezbollah has not (as of this writing) launched a full-scale rocket barrage against Israel — it has activated its forces and signaled readiness without crossing the threshold into all-out war. Iraqi militias have conducted harassment attacks consistent with their pattern since October 2023 but have not escalated to mass-casualty operations. The Houthis have intensified their existing Red Sea campaign rather than opening entirely new fronts. This pattern suggests that while the Quds Force set the conditions for proxy activation, individual group leaders are making their own calculations about escalation levels based on local considerations, risk tolerance, and their assessment of what serves their own interests alongside Iran's.

This distributed decision-making is both a strength and a vulnerability of the network. It provides resilience — no single decapitation strike can shut down all proxy operations simultaneously, and groups can adapt to local conditions without waiting for orders from Tehran. But it also creates risks of unintended escalation: a local commander making a more aggressive decision than Tehran intended could widen the conflict beyond what Iran's strategic calculations support. The 2024 Tower 22 attack that killed three US service members is an example — it provoked US retaliatory strikes against militia positions that Iran's strategic planners may not have intended to invite.

Implications for the Current Conflict

Iran's proxy network transforms a bilateral US-Iran conflict into a multi-theater regional crisis. The United States cannot focus exclusively on striking Iran while proxy groups threaten American personnel in Iraq, commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Israeli civilian populations from Lebanon, and energy infrastructure across the Gulf. Each proxy front demands defensive resources — missile defense batteries, naval escort missions, force protection measures, intelligence collection — that are diverted from the primary campaign against Iran itself.

This is by design. Iran's proxy strategy is explicitly constructed to impose costs across multiple dimensions simultaneously, stretching adversary resources and attention. The US military, despite its enormous capability, faces real limits on how many simultaneous operations it can conduct. Every destroyer assigned to Red Sea defense is one fewer destroyer available for strike operations against Iran. Every Patriot battery defending a Gulf base is one fewer battery available for forward-deployed defense of maneuver forces. Every intelligence analyst tracking Hezbollah rocket movements is one fewer analyst working the Iran target set.

The political implications are equally significant. Proxy attacks create additional constituencies demanding response. If Houthi attacks spike global oil prices, economic pressure builds on Washington. If Iraqi militia attacks kill American soldiers, domestic pressure for retaliation diverts attention from strategic objectives in Iran. If Hezbollah attacks Israel, the US must support Israeli defense while potentially being drawn into a Lebanon campaign it did not plan for. Each proxy front creates new decision points, new risks of miscalculation, and new opportunities for the conflict to escalate beyond its intended scope.

The countervailing risk for Iran is that proxy activation can backfire. If Hezbollah launches a full-scale war against Israel, it risks the destruction of its military infrastructure — a capability that took decades and billions of dollars to build. If Iraqi militias provoke a major US military response, they risk losing the political gains they have accumulated within Iraq's government. And if the proxy network's combined operations push the United States toward a more expansive campaign rather than a limited one, Iran may find that its deterrent tool has become an accelerant to the very outcome it was designed to prevent.

Related Coverage

• Regional Proxy Escalation Routes After Iran Strikes
• Iran Strikes Back: Where Missiles Hit and What Was Damaged
• The CRINK Alliance: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea
• Gulf States' Response to Iranian Attacks
• Iran's Government Structure Explained

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.