Iran Government Structure Explained: Supreme Leader, President, IRGC, and Clerical Power

Overview

Western media coverage of the Iran conflict frequently refers to "Iran's government" as if it were a unitary actor with a single decision-making authority. In reality, Iran's political system is one of the most structurally complex in the world -- a hybrid of theocratic and republican institutions in which elected officials, clerical authorities, military commanders, and intelligence operatives compete for influence within a framework that concentrates ultimate power in a single unelected figure: the Supreme Leader.

This complexity is not academic. It directly affects how Iran responds to the February 2026 strikes, who has authority to approve retaliation, whether diplomatic overtures from Washington will reach the actual decision-makers, and how internal debates about escalation versus restraint will be resolved. An understanding of Iran's government structure is therefore a prerequisite for any informed analysis of what comes next.

This article maps the key institutions, explains the formal and informal power relationships between them, and identifies who actually makes the decisions that matter in a military crisis. It is designed as a reference guide for readers who want to understand the institutional architecture behind the headlines.

What We Know

The Supreme Leader (Rahbar). The Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the Islamic Republic, a position established by the 1979 constitution and modeled on Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist). Since Khomeini's death in 1989, the position has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Supreme Leader's constitutional powers include: commander-in-chief of all armed forces (both the regular military and the IRGC); appointment of the head of the judiciary; appointment of half the members of the Guardian Council; appointment of the heads of state broadcasting, major religious foundations (bonyads), and key economic institutions; final authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, and national security strategy; and the power to dismiss the elected president. The Supreme Leader is selected by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of senior clerics elected by popular vote (though candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council). In practice, the Assembly has never exercised independent oversight and functions largely as a rubber stamp.

The President and Elected Government. Iran's president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term, limited to two consecutive terms. The president heads the executive branch, manages the national budget, appoints cabinet ministers (subject to parliamentary approval), and represents Iran in international forums. However, the president's authority is circumscribed in critical areas. The Supreme Leader retains control over military affairs, nuclear policy, and the IRGC's budget and operations. The Guardian Council can veto legislation passed by parliament, and the Expediency Discernment Council -- appointed by the Supreme Leader -- resolves disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council. The president chairs the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which coordinates national security policy, but the SNSC's decisions require the Supreme Leader's approval to be implemented.

The Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is a 12-member body with enormous gatekeeping power. Six members are Islamic jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader; six are lawyers nominated by the judiciary chief (also appointed by the Supreme Leader) and approved by parliament. The Council performs two functions: it reviews all legislation passed by parliament for compatibility with Islamic law and the constitution (effectively a veto power), and it vets all candidates for presidential, parliamentary, and Assembly of Experts elections. The vetting process has been used systematically to exclude reformist and moderate candidates, most dramatically in the 2024 presidential election when the Council disqualified all but six candidates from a field of dozens.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Established in 1979 as a counterbalance to the regular military -- whose loyalty to the revolution was uncertain -- the IRGC has grown into the most powerful institutional actor in Iran outside the Supreme Leader's office. The IRGC maintains its own ground forces (approximately 150,000 troops), navy (operating primarily in the Persian Gulf), aerospace division (which controls Iran's ballistic missile arsenal), and the Quds Force, which manages proxy relationships with Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and other allied groups across the region. Beyond its military role, the IRGC controls a vast economic empire. Its engineering arm, Khatam al-Anbiya, is Iran's largest contractor, involved in construction, oil and gas, telecommunications, and infrastructure projects. Estimates of the IRGC's share of Iran's GDP range from 20% to 40%, though exact figures are impossible to verify due to the opacity of its financial operations. The IRGC reports directly to the Supreme Leader, not the president or the defense ministry.

The Regular Military (Artesh). Iran's conventional military -- the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Force -- operates separately from the IRGC and has historically been subordinated to it in both budget and prestige. The Artesh has approximately 420,000 active-duty personnel and is responsible for conventional territorial defense. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Artesh and IRGC operated in parallel and sometimes in competition, a dynamic that persists in modified form. The Artesh generally has less political influence than the IRGC and is more receptive to professional military norms, but its commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader and it operates within the same chain of command.

The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The SNSC is the formal decision-making body for national security and military affairs. Its members include the president (chair), the heads of the three branches of government, the chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the IRGC commander, the intelligence minister, the foreign minister, and representatives designated by the Supreme Leader. In a military crisis, the SNSC is where operational decisions are debated and formulated. However, its decisions require the Supreme Leader's ratification, giving Khamenei effective veto power over any course of action. The SNSC secretary, currently a senior official with close ties to the Supreme Leader's office, often functions as the operational coordinator between the elected government and the security establishment.

Analysis

Three features of Iran's power structure are particularly relevant to the current crisis.

The decision to retaliate will be made by Khamenei, not the president. While the president chairs the SNSC and may advocate for a particular response, the Supreme Leader has historically made all critical military and nuclear decisions personally. The 2020 decision to strike Al Asad Air Base in response to the Soleimani assassination was reportedly made by Khamenei with input from senior IRGC commanders, not through a formal SNSC vote. The same pattern is likely for any response to the February 2026 strikes. Western policymakers who attempt to engage Iran through presidential channels should understand that the president can discuss but not commit on matters of war and peace.

The IRGC and Artesh may have different threat assessments and preferred responses. The IRGC, whose infrastructure and personnel are the primary targets of the US strikes, has institutional incentives to advocate for aggressive retaliation that demonstrates its continued capability and relevance. The Artesh, which focuses on territorial defense and is more attuned to the military balance of power, may counsel restraint based on a realistic assessment of Iran's conventional disadvantage against the United States. These institutional rivalries play out behind closed doors but have real consequences for the type, scale, and timing of any Iranian response.

The opacity of decision-making is a feature, not a bug. Iran's leadership deliberately maintains ambiguity about who is making decisions and through what process. This serves multiple purposes: it complicates adversary targeting (decision-making is distributed across multiple locations and individuals), it allows deniability for proxy operations, and it creates negotiating leverage (Iranian diplomats can credibly claim they need to "consult" before committing to any position). For Western analysts and policymakers, this opacity means that signals intelligence and human intelligence are essential for understanding Iranian intentions -- public statements and diplomatic communications alone are unreliable indicators of actual policy direction.

Succession dynamics add a layer of uncertainty. Ayatollah Khamenei is 86 years old and has had reported health issues. The question of who will succeed him as Supreme Leader -- a process managed by the Assembly of Experts -- is the most consequential political question in Iran. Potential successors include Khamenei's son Mojtaba Khamenei, current judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, and several senior clerics. A succession crisis during or immediately after a military conflict could produce unpredictable shifts in Iran's strategic posture, as competing factions jockey for position within the system. The IRGC's role in any succession scenario would be decisive, further elevating its institutional power.

What's Next

The structure of Iran's government creates several dynamics that will shape the post-strike period.

• The Supreme Leader's public statements in the coming days will be the single most important indicator of Iran's intended response. Khamenei's rhetorical choices -- particularly whether he frames the strikes as an act of war requiring a proportional military response or as an aggression that Iran will answer "at a time and place of its choosing" -- will signal the scale and timeline of retaliation.
• The IRGC Quds Force, now commanded by Esmail Qaani (Soleimani's successor), will be the operational arm of any proxy response. Monitoring Quds Force communications, movements, and coordination with Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Houthi forces provides the best available intelligence on Iranian asymmetric retaliation plans.
• Iran's elected officials -- the president, foreign minister, and UN ambassador -- will be deployed on the diplomatic front but should not be mistaken for decision-makers on military matters. Their role is to shape international opinion and create space for the Supreme Leader's preferred strategy, not to negotiate independently.
• Internal debates between hardliners who want visible military retaliation and pragmatists who prefer strategic patience will play out within the SNSC and in private consultations with the Supreme Leader. The outcome depends heavily on Khamenei's personal assessment of Iran's strategic position and his calculation of what response best serves the regime's long-term survival.
• Any diplomatic back-channel initiated by the United States will need to reach the Supreme Leader's office -- not the Foreign Ministry -- to have any prospect of influencing Iran's course of action. This requires intermediaries with established credibility in Khamenei's inner circle, a significantly more difficult proposition than standard diplomatic engagement.

Why It Matters

Misunderstanding Iran's power structure leads directly to policy errors. When Western officials assume that the Iranian president has the authority to negotiate binding agreements on nuclear or military matters, they set themselves up for failed diplomacy. When intelligence analysts treat the IRGC as simply another branch of Iran's military rather than a parallel state with its own strategic logic, they misjudge Iran's decision-making calculus. When media coverage presents Iran's government as a monolithic "regime" without distinguishing between competing institutional interests, it deprives the public of the nuance needed to evaluate policy options.

The February 2026 strikes have elevated these structural questions from academic interest to operational urgency. The individuals and institutions described in this article are the ones who will decide whether Iran retaliates with ballistic missiles, activates proxy forces across the region, accelerates its nuclear program toward a weapon, or seeks a negotiated off-ramp. Understanding their authorities, incentives, and constraints is essential for anyone attempting to assess what comes next.

For American policymakers, the most consequential implication of Iran's power structure is that meaningful de-escalation requires engaging the Supreme Leader's office, not just the elected government. Every successful US-Iran negotiation in the modern era -- including the JCPOA -- ultimately required Khamenei's personal approval. Without a channel to that level of authority, diplomatic efforts will produce atmospherics but not outcomes.

Related Coverage

• History of US-Iran Relations: From the 1953 Coup to the 2026 Strikes
• Why Did Israel Attack Iran? Context and Motivations
• Iran Response to US Strikes: What We Know
• Does Iran Have Nuclear Weapons? Enrichment, Breakout Time & 2026 Status
• Regional Proxy Escalation Routes After Iran Strikes

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.