Iran Refugee Crisis: Could 10 Million People Flee? Borders, Routes, and Humanitarian Impact

Overview

Within hours of the first US and Israeli strikes on February 28, 2026, the humanitarian dimensions of the Iran conflict began to materialize. Satellite imagery analyzed by OCHA showed traffic congestion on major highways radiating outward from Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz as residents attempted to flee population centers near strike targets. Social media posts (filtered through Iran's near-total internet blackout) showed crowded bus stations, fuel shortages, and reports of families loading vehicles with essential possessions. The movement patterns are consistent with the early stages of mass displacement observed in previous conflicts — Syria (2011-2015), Iraq (2003), and Afghanistan (2001).

Iran's 88 million people make it the most populous country ever subjected to a sustained aerial military campaign by Western powers. For comparison, Iraq's population at the time of the 2003 invasion was 25 million; Afghanistan's in 2001 was 21 million; Syria's at the start of the civil war was 21 million. The scale of potential displacement is correspondingly unprecedented. Even if only 5-10% of the population is displaced — a conservative estimate based on historical precedent — the absolute numbers (4.4-8.8 million people) would rival or exceed the entire Syrian refugee population accumulated over a decade of civil war.

The challenge is compounded by geography. Iran is bordered by countries that are either already overwhelmed with existing refugee populations (Pakistan, Turkey), politically hostile to absorbing Iranian refugees (Gulf Arab states), in active conflict themselves (Afghanistan, Iraq), or physically remote (Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan). There is no "safe corridor" comparable to the Turkey-Greece-Europe route that Syrian refugees used, and the international humanitarian infrastructure — already stretched by multiple simultaneous crises — is not positioned or funded to manage displacement at this scale.

Population Displacement Projections

Humanitarian organizations and conflict researchers have produced a range of displacement projections depending on the conflict's intensity, duration, and geographic scope. These projections draw on historical ratios from comparable conflicts while adjusting for Iran-specific factors.

Displacement Projections by Conflict Scenario

Scenario	Duration	Internal Displacement	Cross-Border Refugees	Total Displaced
Limited air campaign (strikes end within 2 weeks)	2-4 weeks	1-2 million	200,000-500,000	1.2-2.5 million
Sustained air campaign (1-3 months)	1-3 months	3-5 million	1-2 million	4-7 million
Extended conflict with ground operations	6+ months	5-8 million	2-5 million	7-13 million
Full-scale war with regime collapse	12+ months	8-15 million	5-10 million	13-25 million

The Cato Institute's pre-conflict assessment, published in January 2026 as tensions escalated, warned that a sustained military campaign "could produce the largest refugee crisis in recorded history." The assessment noted that Iran's population density in urban areas — Tehran alone has 9 million residents in the city proper and 16 million in the metropolitan area — means that even limited strikes on urban peripheries can displace massive numbers. The historical displacement rate from air campaigns (using Syria and Iraq as baselines) suggests that approximately 15-20% of the population within 50 kilometers of strike zones will attempt to relocate within the first 72 hours.

Critical variables that will determine actual displacement include: the geographic scope of strikes (currently focused on military and nuclear sites, but civilian infrastructure damage is expected to expand), the duration of the campaign, whether ground operations follow, the extent of Iranian civilian infrastructure destruction (power, water, transportation), and the availability of internal relocation options versus the necessity of cross-border flight. If strikes expand to target economic infrastructure — refineries, ports, highways — the displacement multiplier increases significantly because populations are deprived of the basic services needed to remain in place.

Border Status Country by Country

Iran shares land borders with seven countries, totaling approximately 5,894 kilometers. Each bordering state faces unique constraints and calculations regarding potential Iranian refugee flows. As of February 28, 2026, the border status of each neighboring country is as follows.

Iran Border Status as of February 28, 2026

Country	Border Length	Status	Capacity Assessment
Pakistan	959 km	Sealed (military deployment)	Cannot absorb; hosts 1.7M Afghan refugees
Turkey	534 km	Enhanced security; limited crossings	Severely strained; hosts 3.2M Syrian refugees
Iraq	1,599 km	Partially open (Kurdish region)	Limited; internal displacement ongoing
Afghanistan	921 km	Nominally open; practically impassable	None; Taliban-governed, active conflict
Turkmenistan	1,148 km	Closed (standing policy)	None; authoritarian state, sealed borders
Azerbaijan	689 km	Enhanced security; limited crossings	Minimal; small country, limited infrastructure
Armenia	44 km	Open but remote	Minimal; small country, economic constraints

Pakistan: Sealed Border

Pakistan sealed its 959-kilometer border with Iran within hours of the first strikes, deploying additional Frontier Corps units and declaring a security emergency in Balochistan Province. The Pakistani military's border closure was accompanied by a statement from the Interior Ministry declaring that "Pakistan cannot accept any refugee inflow from Iran at this time" and citing the country's existing burden of hosting approximately 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees (with an estimated additional 1-2 million unregistered Afghans).

The Pakistan-Iran border runs through some of the most inhospitable terrain on Earth: the Balochistan desert in the south and the rugged mountains of Sistan-Baluchestan in the center. The border is already heavily militarized due to longstanding security concerns, including cross-border drug trafficking, Baloch separatist activity, and periodic armed clashes between Iranian and Pakistani border forces. There are only two official crossing points — Taftan-Mirjaveh in the south and a smaller crossing near Gabd-Rimdan — and both were closed by the Pakistani authorities on February 28.

Despite the official closure, irregular border crossings are likely. The Balochistan border is porous, with established smuggling routes that bypass official checkpoints. The Baloch ethnic community straddles the border, with familial and tribal connections on both sides. Humanitarian organizations expect that some Iranian civilians — particularly ethnic Baloch from southeastern Iran — will cross through irregular channels regardless of the official closure. Pakistan's capacity to prevent all crossings across 959 kilometers of desert and mountain terrain is limited, and a significant informal flow is probable if the conflict intensifies.

Pakistan's refugee capacity is genuinely exhausted. The country ranks among the world's top refugee-hosting nations (primarily due to decades of Afghan displacement), but its economic constraints — 30% inflation, IMF bailout conditionality, political instability — leave virtually no fiscal or administrative space for additional refugee absorption. The international community has consistently failed to burden-share Pakistan's existing refugee costs, and Islamabad has no incentive to voluntarily accept additional obligations.

Turkey: Capacity Concerns

Turkey shares a 534-kilometer border with Iran that runs through mountainous terrain in eastern Anatolia. As of February 28, Turkey has not formally sealed the border but has implemented enhanced security measures, including deployment of additional gendarmerie units, activation of surveillance systems, and temporary closure of the Gurbulak-Bazargan border crossing — the primary commercial and passenger crossing between the two countries.

Turkey already hosts the world's largest refugee population: approximately 3.2 million Syrian refugees under "temporary protection" status, plus several hundred thousand Afghans, Iraqis, and others. The Syrian refugee presence has become a major domestic political issue, with Turkish public opinion increasingly hostile to refugee communities and opposition parties campaigning on platforms of repatriation. President Erdogan, who built significant political capital by hosting Syrian refugees in the early years of the crisis, now faces intense domestic pressure to prevent any new influx.

Turkey's geographic position makes it both the most likely and the most strategically significant destination for Iranian refugees. Unlike Pakistan (desert terrain) or Iraq (active conflict), the Turkey-Iran border connects to established transportation infrastructure and leads to one of the region's largest economies. Iranian diaspora communities in Istanbul and Ankara (estimated at 400,000-500,000) provide a social network that attracts new arrivals. However, Turkey's stated position is clear: it will not accept a mass influx. The International Rescue Committee assessed in a February 2026 briefing that Turkey would likely allow limited crossings for emergency cases (medical evacuations, unaccompanied minors) while blocking mass flow, potentially creating a dangerous bottleneck of vulnerable populations on the Iranian side of the border.

Iraq: Overflow Risk

Iraq shares the longest border with Iran at 1,599 kilometers, running from the Kurdish north through the Zagros Mountains to the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the south. The Iraq-Iran border is the most likely route for mass displacement because of its length, the ethnic and religious connections between Iraqi and Iranian populations (particularly among Shia communities), and the relative porosity of the border in the Kurdish region.

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), governed semi-autonomously by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), represents the most accessible refuge for Iranians fleeing western Iran. The KRG has historically been more welcoming to refugees than the central Iraqi government, hosting significant populations of displaced Iraqis from the ISIS conflict and a smaller number of Iranian Kurdish refugees. The Haji Omaran and Parviz Khan border crossings connect to roads leading to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, the KRI's two largest cities.

However, the KRG's capacity is severely limited. The Kurdish economy, dependent on oil revenue sharing with Baghdad (which has been disputed and intermittent), is already strained. The region hosts approximately 250,000 internally displaced Iraqis and 250,000 Syrian refugees. Infrastructure in border areas is limited, and the mountainous terrain between the border and major cities makes rapid establishment of refugee camps logistically challenging, particularly in winter conditions.

Central and southern Iraq present a different dynamic. Iran's influence in Iraq through Shia political parties and militias means that the Iraqi government is unlikely to formally restrict Iranian refugee movement. But Iraq's own internal displacement crisis — 1.2 million Iraqis remain displaced from the ISIS conflict — and the political fragility of the Iraqi state mean that absorbing large Iranian populations would further destabilize an already precarious situation. The MSF operational assessment warned that a significant Iranian refugee influx into southern Iraq could overwhelm health, water, and sanitation infrastructure in Basra Province, which already suffers from chronic underinvestment.

Afghanistan: The Impossible Route

Afghanistan shares a 921-kilometer border with Iran, but represents the least viable refugee destination. Under Taliban governance since August 2021, Afghanistan is itself experiencing one of the world's worst humanitarian crises: 28 million people (two-thirds of the population) require humanitarian assistance, and the country has been a source rather than a destination for refugees for four decades.

The Iran-Afghanistan border runs through the barren deserts of Sistan-Baluchestan and Khorasan provinces, with limited infrastructure and no significant urban centers on the Afghan side. The Islam Qala border crossing, the primary official crossing point, connects to Herat — a city that is itself struggling to manage the return of hundreds of thousands of Afghans deported from Iran and Pakistan in recent years.

The irony of the Afghanistan route is that it represents a reversal of the existing flow. Iran currently hosts approximately 780,000 registered Afghan refugees and an estimated 2-3 million undocumented Afghan migrants. A sustained conflict in Iran could displace this Afghan population back to Afghanistan while simultaneously pushing some Iranian civilians in the opposite direction, creating a chaotic bidirectional flow across the border. The Taliban government has not issued any statement regarding Iranian refugees, and its capacity to manage any significant population movement is effectively zero.

Refugee Routes and Corridors

Based on historical displacement patterns, geography, and current border conditions, humanitarian planners have identified the most likely refugee routes and corridors.

Northern corridor (Iran to Turkey/Armenia): Refugees from northwestern Iran (East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan provinces — combined population approximately 10 million) would move northwest toward the Turkish border through the cities of Tabriz and Urmia. This corridor follows established highway infrastructure and leads to the Gurbulak-Bazargan crossing. If the main crossing is blocked, secondary routes through the mountainous terrain are available but dangerous, particularly in winter conditions. A smaller flow may cross the 44-kilometer Armenian border, though Armenia's small size and limited economy constrain its absorption capacity.

Western corridor (Iran to Iraq/Kurdistan): Refugees from western Iran (Kermanshah, Ilam, Lorestan, and Kurdistan provinces — combined population approximately 6 million) would move west toward the Iraqi border. The Kurdish population in these provinces has familial and ethnic ties to Iraqi Kurdistan, making this route culturally as well as geographically logical. Multiple crossing points exist along the 1,599-kilometer border, though terrain is mountainous and winter conditions create significant hazards.

Southeastern corridor (Iran to Pakistan): Refugees from Sistan-Baluchestan Province (population approximately 3 million, predominantly ethnic Baloch) would move toward the Pakistani border despite its official closure. Cross-border Baloch tribal networks provide informal passage routes, and the desert terrain, while hostile, is familiar to local populations. This corridor is the most dangerous due to extreme temperatures, lack of water, and the risk of being caught between Iranian and Pakistani security forces.

Internal displacement corridors: The majority of displaced Iranians will not cross international borders but will instead relocate internally. Historical patterns suggest movement from urban centers near strike zones toward rural areas, smaller cities, and the Caspian coast (which is geographically insulated from the primary strike zones in central and western Iran). The Tehran metropolitan area's 16 million residents represent the single largest displacement risk: even a 10% evacuation rate would produce 1.6 million displaced persons requiring shelter, food, and medical care.

UNHCR Capacity Assessment

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) activated its Level 3 emergency response — the highest classification in its emergency framework — within hours of the February 28 strikes. Level 3 activation authorizes the agency to redirect resources from other operations, deploy emergency surge staff, and activate pre-positioned relief stocks. However, the gap between UNHCR's capacity and the potential scale of the crisis is enormous.

UNHCR's 2026 global budget is $11.2 billion, of which only 48% was funded as of January 2026 — a funding gap of $5.8 billion even before the Iran crisis. The agency is already managing emergency operations in Sudan, Myanmar, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and multiple other countries. Its operational presence in Iran is minimal: a small office in Tehran and limited field presence, constrained by Iranian government restrictions on international humanitarian organizations operating within its territory.

UNHCR's pre-positioned emergency stocks in the region include relief items for approximately 600,000 people — a figure that assumes scenarios from ongoing crises and is wholly inadequate for the potential scale of Iranian displacement. The agency has begun activating its Global Stockpile in Dubai, Copenhagen, and Amman, which can equip an additional 250,000-500,000 people with basic shelter, blankets, and hygiene kits. Even at full mobilization, UNHCR's material capacity covers approximately 1 million people — potentially 10-20% of the displaced population in a sustained conflict scenario.

The agency's operational constraints extend beyond material capacity. UNHCR's emergency coordinator for the Iran response acknowledged in a February 28 briefing that "we are operating in a context where border states have either closed their borders or signaled they will not accept mass influxes, sanctions restrictions impede financial transfers into Iran, the internet shutdown prevents communication with affected populations, and physical access to Iran is severely constrained by the ongoing military operations." These conditions represent what humanitarian professionals describe as a "four-wall" crisis — one where the affected population is trapped within a conflict zone with limited escape routes and limited international assistance.

Comparison to Syrian Refugee Crisis

The Syrian refugee crisis — which displaced 6.8 million refugees externally and 6.9 million internally over more than a decade of civil war — is the most relevant comparison for the potential Iran displacement. However, the comparison reveals both parallels and critical differences that suggest the Iranian crisis could be significantly worse.

Syria vs. Iran: Displacement Risk Comparison

Factor	Syria (2011-2023)	Iran (Projected)
Pre-conflict population	21 million	88 million
Displacement rate (external)	32%	5-10% (projected)
Neighboring countries willing to host	Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan (initially open)	None fully open
Time to peak displacement	5-6 years (gradual)	Weeks to months (acute)
EU route availability	Turkey-Greece corridor	No direct corridor
Humanitarian access	Partial (cross-border from Turkey/Jordan)	Near zero (borders sealed, sanctions)
Pre-existing infrastructure	Limited but existed	No refugee camps exist near borders

The most critical difference is population scale. Iran's population is more than four times Syria's pre-war population. Even if the displacement rate is proportionally smaller (5-10% versus Syria's 32%), the absolute numbers could match or exceed Syria's totals. A 10% displacement rate in Iran produces 8.8 million displaced people — roughly equivalent to Syria's entire refugee crisis compressed into weeks rather than years.

The second critical difference is border permeability. When Syria's crisis began, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan initially adopted open-border policies that allowed Syrians to flee to safety. These policies were later tightened as the scale became overwhelming, but the initial openness saved millions of lives. In the Iran case, neighboring countries have sealed borders from the outset, reflecting lessons learned (and political backlash experienced) from the Syrian crisis. This means that Iranian civilians may be trapped within the conflict zone with no accessible escape route — a scenario that dramatically increases the risk of civilian casualties.

Hosting Country Burden

Even under optimistic scenarios, any country that absorbs significant numbers of Iranian refugees will face severe economic and social strain. The hosting burden calculation involves direct costs (shelter, food, healthcare, education) and indirect costs (infrastructure strain, labor market disruption, social tensions, political backlash).

Turkey's experience hosting 3.2 million Syrian refugees provides a cautionary baseline. The World Bank estimated Turkey's direct hosting costs at approximately $40 billion over the first decade, with significant additional indirect costs including infrastructure expansion, healthcare system strain, and education provision. International burden-sharing has been inadequate: the EU pledged 6 billion euros in direct support, and various bilateral donors contributed several billion more, but Turkey absorbed the majority of costs domestically. Public resentment toward Syrian refugees has become a defining feature of Turkish domestic politics, contributing to opposition gains in local elections and forcing the government to adopt increasingly restrictive policies.

For the Iran crisis, the hosting burden calculation is complicated by several additional factors. First, sanctions restrictions prevent normal international financial transfers to Iran-related humanitarian operations, meaning that even if donors pledge funds, the mechanics of spending them are legally and logistically complex. Second, the economic conditions in the most likely hosting countries (Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq) are already strained, with limited fiscal space for additional spending. Third, the political dynamics in hosting countries are uniformly hostile to new refugee absorption, meaning that governments face domestic political costs for accepting refugees that may exceed any international financial support they receive.

The international community's track record on refugee burden-sharing provides little basis for optimism. The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees committed signatories to more equitable distribution of hosting costs, but implementation has been minimal. The Syrian crisis demonstrated that refugee hosting burdens fall overwhelmingly on neighboring countries rather than being distributed globally. There is no reason to expect the pattern to differ for Iran.

International Aid Commitments

As of February 28, 2026, international aid commitments specific to the Iran crisis remain minimal. The UN has not yet issued a formal flash appeal (typically issued within the first week of a crisis), and donor governments are focused on the military and diplomatic dimensions of the conflict rather than the humanitarian response. The following commitments have been announced as of this writing:

• UNHCR: Activated Level 3 emergency response; redirected $50 million from existing budgets; deploying 200 emergency surge staff to Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. Flash appeal expected within 48-72 hours, estimated at $500 million to $1 billion for initial 3-month response.
• ICRC: Activated emergency protocols; deploying surgical teams and medical supplies to Tehran, Isfahan, and border regions. Budget commitment not yet announced.
• MSF/Doctors Without Borders: Activating emergency response in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish border regions. Pre-positioning medical supplies at border crossing points.
• EU: European Commission announced initial allocation of 100 million euros for humanitarian response, channeled through ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations). Additional funding dependent on displacement scale assessment.
• US: No humanitarian aid commitments announced as of February 28. USAID has not issued a statement regarding humanitarian response. This is politically sensitive because the US is simultaneously conducting military operations and would face criticism for bombing Iran while funding humanitarian relief.

The aid gap is likely to be substantial. Based on the Syrian precedent, a displacement crisis of 5 million people requires approximately $5-8 billion annually in humanitarian funding to provide basic life-sustaining assistance (shelter, food, water, healthcare). Current commitments total approximately $150 million — less than 3% of the minimum estimated need.

Internally Displaced

The majority of displacement resulting from the Iran conflict will be internal rather than cross-border. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) face distinct challenges because they remain within the conflict zone, under the authority of their own government (which may lack the capacity or willingness to assist them), and largely invisible to the international humanitarian system that is designed primarily to assist refugees who cross international borders.

Iran's internal geography creates natural displacement patterns. The primary strike targets — nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, military installations near Tehran, and IRGC facilities across the country — are concentrated in central Iran. Populations in these areas will move toward the periphery: the Caspian coast in the north (Mazandran and Gilan provinces, which are geographically shielded by the Alborz Mountains), the northeastern region around Mashhad, and the southwestern coast along the Persian Gulf.

Internal displacement is complicated by Iran's 4% internet connectivity as of February 28. The government's near-total internet shutdown, implemented as both a security measure and a tool of information control, prevents displaced populations from accessing real-time information about safe routes, receiving warnings about strike zones, communicating with family members, or accessing digital financial services. The shutdown also impedes humanitarian coordination: international organizations cannot communicate with local staff, assess needs, or coordinate resource distribution using normal channels.

Iran's domestic infrastructure for managing internal displacement is limited. The country lacks the kind of permanent refugee camp infrastructure that exists in neighboring countries (Turkey's container cities, Jordan's Zaatari camp). The Iranian Red Crescent Society, which would be the primary domestic responder, has significant organizational capability but limited material resources for a crisis of this scale. The government's ability to redirect resources from other functions to displacement management is constrained by the simultaneous demands of the military conflict, the ongoing economic crisis, and the communication blackout.

What Happens Next

The trajectory of the displacement crisis depends on variables that will become clearer in the coming days and weeks. Several key indicators will determine whether the crisis remains manageable or escalates to catastrophic proportions.

• Strike scope expansion: If strikes remain focused on military and nuclear targets, displacement will be concentrated and potentially manageable through internal relocation. If strikes expand to economic infrastructure (refineries, power plants, transportation networks), displacement will accelerate dramatically as civilian populations lose access to the basic services needed to remain in place.
• Duration of military operations: A short campaign (1-2 weeks) will produce a spike of displacement that partially reverses once operations cease. A sustained campaign (months) will produce cumulative displacement as the humanitarian situation deteriorates and internal relocation options are exhausted.
• Border policy evolution: Current border closures may soften under humanitarian pressure, particularly if images of desperate civilians at sealed borders generate international media attention. Turkey, with its democratic institutions and EU aspirations, is the most likely candidate for a policy shift, but domestic political constraints make large-scale opening improbable.
• International humanitarian response scale: The speed and scale of the UN flash appeal, donor response, and NGO mobilization will determine whether basic humanitarian needs (shelter, food, water, medical care) can be met for displaced populations. The current response pace is inadequate for the projected scale of need.
• Iranian government response: The Iranian government's management of internal displacement — including whether it allocates resources to civilian protection or diverts them entirely to the military effort — will significantly affect the humanitarian outcome. The internet shutdown suggests the government's priority is information control rather than civilian assistance, but the calculation may shift if internal displacement creates domestic political pressure.

The humanitarian community's darkest scenario — a protracted conflict producing millions of displaced people with sealed borders, no humanitarian access, and inadequate international response — is not the most likely outcome, but it is a plausible one. The window for preventing the worst outcomes is narrow and requires immediate action: border access negotiations, sanctions exemptions for humanitarian transfers, pre-positioning of relief supplies, and donor commitments at a scale commensurate with the potential need. Every day of delay reduces the humanitarian community's ability to respond effectively when the displacement peak arrives.

Related Coverage

• Displacement Risks After Iran-Israel Escalation
• Iran Civilian Casualties and the Humanitarian Crisis
• Iran Protests 2026: The Uprising That Preceded the War
• Civilian Protection Rules for Strikes in Urban Areas
• Iran Sanctions Explained: How They Crushed Iran's Economy and Fueled the Crisis

Sources

Last updated: February 28, 2026. This article is revised when new evidence materially changes what can be stated with confidence.